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Abstract
Networked distributed sensing systems (NDSSs) have been widely adopted in many real-world
applications which can be either described as cyber-physical system (CPS) or indeed the Inter-
net of Things (IoT). The security and trust in such systems are of paramount importance. In
practice, sensor readings may be abnormal or faulty due to various unpredictable causes such
as the harsh environments in which they are deployed, the sensors are inherently fault-prone,
or they experience malicious attacks. However, although a large body of research has been
looking at detecting such anomalies, we have yet seen a common solution that can eﬀectively
detect all general anomalies in NDSSs. Many current solutions are either simple but limited
by rigid assumptions, or powerful but complex and therefore not suited to resource scarce and
large-scale NDSSs. To overcome this problem, we have investigated the causes and patterns
of anomaly behaviours in NDSS, and propose a lightweight general solution that can identify
most general anomalies in resource-limited NDSSs.
This solution consists of three diﬀerent components: feature extraction, sensor grouping, and
anomaly classification. In feature extraction, we propose two multi-feature dimensionality
reduction algorithms, MFDR and MFDR-N. These algorithms extract distinctive time-series
features from raw sensor measurements and provide their dimensionality-reduced (DR) rep-
resentations. In comparison to traditional time-series approaches, MFDR and MFDR-N can
provide multiple types of time-series features which can better approximate the original data
with smaller error. In addition, to ensure our solution can scale to diﬀerent sizes of NDSSs while
being able to perform sophisticated detection schemes, we propose a distributed matching-based
grouping algorithm, DMGA, which clusters sensors into correlation groups where a strong spa-
tiotemporal correlation exists among all sensors. To the best of our knowledge, this grouping
algorithm is the first one to provide performance guarantees in terms of correlation strength.
Ultimately, we propose two general anomaly detection classifiers, GAD and FGAD, to cap-
ture rapid and gradual pattern changes in sensor measurements, respectively. Both of these
are lightweight in terms of computation complexity and can adapt fast to changes in non-
stationary environments. Our experimental results show that both GAD and FGAD are very
eﬀective against various types of anomalies in real-world NDSS.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Networked distributed sensing systems (NDSSs) have been providing promising opportunities
in many critical segments including cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and Internet of Things
(IoT). NDSSs consist of many sensor nodes which provide real-time measurements of envi-
ronmental physical processes, such as temperature, humidity, illumination, vibration, chemical
gas, and smart-power-meter readings. With properly designed data mining and analysis tools,
these measurements can be exploited to infer potential knowledge, which allows us to better
understand the current state of environments. This not only can be used to improve control de-
cisions in complex systems such as national-wide smart grids, but help human beings to solve
complicated problems, such as city-wide residential behaviours [RLSS10] and disease-spread
estimation [SKS12].
In practice, sensor measurements may be abnormal or faulty due to various unpredictable
reasons such as harsh environments, inherently fault-prone sensors, or malicious attacks (e.g.
false data injection (FDI) attacks in smart grid systems). In CPSs, these anomalies could lead
to significant system performance degradation or even catastrophic failures, since actuation is
typically driven from the understanding of the state of the system and if this understanding is
erroneous, serious repercussions may arise. Therefore, to ensure the overall system integrity, it
1
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is important to identify and understand such anomalies. In addition to the these faults, sensor
measurements can also be anomalous due to the non-stationary nature of the environments,
where sensor measurements may deviate when new events occur (e.g. leakage in water systems).
Detecting such deviations helps to identify genuine events and novelties in which users are
interested. However, they should not be misdiagnosed as faults.
Anomaly detection in NDSSs is essentially a classification procedure, where time series data is
classified into norms or anomalies. This procedure typically consists of two diﬀerent phases: fea-
ture extraction and anomaly classification. In the first phase, meaningful features are extracted
from raw data to capture the essential properties of such data. Various feature extraction
methodologies have been proposed, based on statistical measures (e.g. mean and standard de-
viation) [UBH09], principal components [FRM94], frequency components [FRM94], piecewise
polynomials [KCPM01a], time series extrema [VMB13], and ordered sequences [GZH09]. These
features then can be exploited to establish models that represent norms (and anomalies). With
these models, features that are computed from newly arrived measurements can be classified
into anomalies or norms with properly designed classification schemes, which can be either
statistical [ZHM+12] or machine-learning based [OGIR14].
Unfortunately, although there exists a large body of research on NDSS anomaly detection, we
have yet so seen a general solution that can eﬀectively detect both types of anomalies (i.e. sensor
failures and environmental events) in real-world NDSSs been proposed. Previous literatures are
either limited to the their rigid assumptions (e.g. they assume that physical phenomena follow
some specific models) or neglect the deployment limitations and challenges of NDSSs (of which
the details will be discussed in Chapter 2.1.1). For example, statistical approaches typically
provide simple and accurate detection results; however, these approaches usually neglect the
dynamic and heterogeneous nature of NDSSs and can make rigid assumptions regarding data
distributions. Therefore, they lack generality and cannot be equally eﬀective for all scenarios.
To alleviate anomaly detection schemes from rigid assumptions, some machine-learning-based
classification approaches have been introduced. However, they are usually too expensive to
compute on resource-limited NDSS sensor nodes, and sometimes can be unrealistic in terms of
practical deployments in real-world scenarios as the training data with ground-truth anomaly
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conditions provided is typically unavailable.
1.2 Objectives
In response to the need of an universal solution that can eﬀectively identify data anomalies in
most practical networked distributed sensing systems (NDSSs), we would like propose a solution
which pushes the data analysing task to the edge of the network (i.e. each sensor node) in a
distributed manner, while minimising the number of assumptions made by the approaches. To
be more specific, here we summarise the following three objectives we would like to achieve
with our solution:
1. Propose an universal solution to eﬃciently identify their occurrences while
coping with complex and non-stationary environments.
To be able to tag data with a notion of trust means one needs to identify if that data
is deviating from the norm by carrying out anomaly detection. However, there are three
challenges here. The first is that sensor readings may have diﬀerent covariance functions
as per physical processes [BDOS01, DD11]. For example, in a given space, nearby hu-
midity sensors typically have similar readings whereas the readings of radiation sensors
varies with respect to the distance from radiation sources. Since NDSSs are deployed
in heterogeneous environments, where may simultaneously exist diﬀerent types of phys-
ical process (e.g. temperature, humidity, and radiation), we need an universal solution
without assuming the underlying covariance function.
Secondly, without assuming the distribution of sensor measurements and their covariance
function, finding eﬀective thresholds to separate anomalies from norms becomes a chal-
lenging task. Using static thresholds [UBH09, CPBN10] to detect anomalies can be unde-
sirable as these thresholds should vary as per hardware capability (e.g. sensors functional
range) and the deployed environment (e.g. controlled warehouse verses the wild). Al-
though some approaches try to overcome this problem with supervised machine-learning
techniques [OWP08, OGIR14]; unfortunately, these approaches can be inapplicable in
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real-world NDSSs since the ground truth anomaly condition of sensor measurements are
typically unavailable. Therefore, our solution is required to be able compute these thresh-
olds from the current state of the environment without making rigid assumptions.
Thirdly, natural environments are usually non-stationary [OGIR14]. The characteristics
of physical phenomena may change over time. Even where one can adopt modeling
techniques, such as regression, to capture the model of the current environment, this model
may no longer be eﬀective for distinguishing anomalies from the norms since changes may
occur in the environment. Therefore, in our research, we aim to propose a solution that
not only can detect anomalies with minimum assumptions, but is able to dynamically
adapt to changes in the environment.
2. Propose new feature-extraction methods that can extract multiple descriptive
features from sensor measurements.
According to our research, anomalies in NDSSs can be mainly classified into three cate-
gories as to their patterns (the details which will be further discussed in Chapter 2.3.2).
They are rapid pattern changes, gradual pattern changes, and seasonal pattern changes.
To detect the anomalies in the latter two categories means that we have to examine sensor
measurements in bulk (i.e. a number of measurements need to be processed together to
infer their anomaly condition). However, directly applying data mining procedures (e.g.
anomaly detection) on such bulk measurements in raw formats can be very expensive
due to their high dimensionality [vdMPvdH09]; also, the random noise embedded in raw
measurements may degrade the accuracy of post data analytics [Tan14].
To overcome this problem, many recent approaches (such as [YSGG10, YxXgJ11, CWT12])
adopt dimensionality-reduced (DR) techniques (e.g. principal component analysis (PCA))
to extract DR features from raw measurements before applying anomaly detection schemes.
Unfortunately, although a large body of research has been focused on feature extraction
techniques for such time series data [Fu11], we have yet seen an approach which can
cope with the heterogeneous nature of sensor measurements as these approaches typically
only extract one type of feature from the raw data. Therefore, given a set of sensor
1.2. Objectives 5
measurements, if the essential property of such measurements cannot be captured by the
extraction technique, the extracted features can be less descriptive and may result in er-
roneous analytics results. For example, using a piecewise polynomial to summarise highly
fluctuated data can be ineﬀective as this technique cannot capture the frequency signals
therein. To solve this problem we propose an adaptive feature extraction method which
not only can reduce the error between DR representations and the original data, but can
extract multiple types of features that can capture most of the major properties of sensor
measurements.
3. Propose a lightweight grouping algorithm that can group resource-limited
NDSS sensor nodes into correlation groups where strong correlations exist
among all sensors.
As we mentioned above, NDSSs typically consist of resource-limited sensor nodes. En-
ergy supply is a typical issue for such systems [GH09] even with new energy harvesting
technologies (e.g. solar [FZS08] and vibration [MYR+08]). To ensure the overall sus-
tainability of the NDSSs, it is desirable to minimise unnecessary operations, such as the
power-consuming wireless communications, caused by the anomaly detection algorithms.
Furthermore, real-world NDSSs (e.g. underground water systems and smart grids) are
typically deployed at large scale (i.e. city-wide and national-wide) or in dense envi-
ronments. Therefore to ensure that our approach can be applied on such NDSSs, it is
necessary to ensure that the computational complexity of our solutions are scale-invariant
(i.e. O(1) with respect to the size of NDSSs).
To allow our solution to run on resource-limited sensor nodes and scale to large-scale
NDSSs, one straight-forward solution is to minimise the computational and communica-
tion overhead introduced by the anomaly detection algorithms. However, there is often a
trade-oﬀ between algorithm complexity and accuracy. For example, rule-based approaches
are simple to compute and are typically independent of NDSS sizes [UBH09]; however,
their rigid assumptions prevent them being eﬀective in complex and heterogeneous NDSSs.
Another solution is to group sensors into clusters. With a properly designed grouping
algorithm, we can decompose an anomaly-detection problem into several sub-problems by
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grouping nearby sensors whose readings are highly correlated. However, to support our
spatiotemporal-correlation-based anomaly-detection scheme, we need an algorithm which
not only can reduce the overhead introduced by our algorithm, but can ensure the sensors
in each correlation group are strongly correlated. To the best of our knowledge, tradi-
tional grouping algorithms in NDSSs cannot provide this property as they are typically
designed to fulfill routing and energy-balancing requirements.
1.3 Contributions
To achieve the objectives discussed in Chapter 1.2, we propose a series of approaches to over-
come the limitations of previous work, summarised as follows:
1. We propose two new feature-extraction techniques, MFDR and MFDR-N,
which not only reduces the dimensionality of sensor readings but also improves
the overall accuracy of an anomaly detection scheme.
In Chapter 5, we propose a novel multi-feature dimensionality-reduction (MFDR) tech-
nique. MFDR utilises two dimension-reduction techniques to describe two types of time-
series components in sensor measurements, i.e. local trends and periodically fluctuating
seasonal components. Each of these time-series components provides informative features
that can be later exploited by our anomaly detection algorithms. Compared to other tradi-
tional approaches, MDFR provides adaptive representations which can dynamically adapt
to diﬀerent environments and provides its optimal dimension-reduced features that can
better illustrate the original time series. We also extend MFDR with a novel white noise
filtering technique, and propose MFDR-N. In addition to aforementioned two time-series
components, MFDR-N further retains the energy information of white noise, providing
better illustrations of noisy time series. Our evaluation results illustrated in Chapter5.5
show that both MFDR and MFDR-N achieve lower error when summarising time series
data among all 45 diﬀerent data sets, compared to other state-of-the-art approaches.
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2. We propose DMGA, a distributed grouping algorithm which is able to group
sensors into clusters, while guarantee the sensors in the same cluster are
spatiotemporally correlated.
In response to the need of an online grouping algorithm, in Chapter 6, we exploit the
max-weight-matching technique in graph theory and propose a novel clustering scheme
named distributed matching-based grouping algorithm (DMGA). This is a bottom-up
hierarchical clustering algorithm performed by each sensor node in a fully distributed
manner. As far as we are aware, DMGA is the first grouping algorithm that provides
optimised-correlation guarantees to correlation-based anomaly detection schemes for sens-
ing systems. Unlike other traditional clustering algorithms such as classic K-nearest
neighbour clustering [EAP+02] or unweighted-pair-group methods with arithmetic mean
(UPGMA), DMGA guarantees strong spatiotemporal correlations among all sensors in
each correlation group even in the worst-case scenarios. Also, DMGA is very lightweight
to compute as its computational complexity is O(1) with respect to the size of NDSS.
More importantly, our experiment results in Chapter 6.8 show that DMGA does not only
help to reduce the overall computational complexity of our anomaly detection algorithm
to O(1) with respect to the size of NDSS, but improves the detection accuracy of our
anomaly detection algorithms.
3. We propose two general but eﬀective anomaly classifiers, GAD and FGAD,
which can eﬀectively detect most of anomalies in NDSSs by exploiting the
spatiotemporal correlation.
After solving the scalability problem with DMGA, in Chapter 7, we utilise the spatiotem-
poral correlation between nearby sensors and propose a general anomaly detection (GAD)
algorithm. GAD is capable of identifying anomalies that cause rapid pattern changes in
sensor measurements, and tag each sensor measurement with an anomaly condition in
real time. This algorithm consists of three phases: pairwise correlation-consistency as-
sessment, trust-based voting, and event and anomaly classification. In the first phase,
for each correlation group, GAD computes the current pairwise spatial-correlation model
between each sensors therein. GAD then assesses whether these model are temporally
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consistent to those learnt from historical data. With these assessment results, in the
second phase, a trust-based voting scheme is performed to identify anomalous measure-
ments. Ultimately, in the third phase, a classification scheme is applied to distinguish
genuine events from other anomalies.
In addition to GAD, we incorporate MFDR and MFDR-N with our GAD framework
and propose a feature-based anomaly detection (FGAD) algorithm. Diﬀerent from GAD,
FGAD is designed to detect gradual pattern changes that can only be identified from
long-term data. Our evaluations prove that both GAD and FGAD are eﬀective to detect
anomalies in real-world NDSSs, and can fast adapt to genuine environmental changes in
non-stationary environments.
1.4 Thesis Organisation
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 gives the preliminary background of
NDSSs and the anomalies therein. Chapter 3 presents a taxonomy of recently proposed NDSS
anomaly-detection approaches and discuss their pros and cons. An overview of our solution is
introduced in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we propose two multi-feature dimensionality-reduction
techniques, MFDR and MFDR-N, which can extract features from sensor measurements while
minimising the error between features and original data. In Chapter 6, we propose a dis-
tributed max-weight-matching-based grouping algorithm, DMGA, which can eﬀectively group
sensor nodes into clusters where the spatiotemporal correlation between sensors and their mea-
surements are guaranteed. In Chapter 7, we propose a general anomaly detection (GAD)
algorithm that can detect rapid-change anomalies that exist in each sensor measurements in
most of general NDSS environments. Another feature-based GAD (FGAD) is also proposed to
detect gradual-change anomalies that exist in long-term measurement patterns. Ultimately, we
conclude this thesis in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we are going to present the background study regarding our research on anomaly
detection in NDSS. In Chapter 2.1, we will introduce networked distributed sensing system
(NDSS) and formally define the components in this system. The spatiotemporal correlation in
NDSSs will be discussed Chapter 2.2 with real-world examples. In Chapter 2.3, we will discuss
the potential anomalies behind the scene of NDSSs, from two diﬀerent aspects including their
causes and patterns. Eventually, a general anomaly-management flowchart will be present to
summarise how anomalies are handled in real-world NDSSs in Chapter 2.3.3. Note that the
related work regarding NDSS anomaly detection will be presented in Chapter 3.
2.1 Network Distributed Sensing Systems (NDSSs)
Networked distributed sensing systems (NDSSs) exist in large body of industrial applications
[GH09, Che14, YCK+10], such as weather forecasting [MZA12], pollution control [BSP12],
structural-health monitoring[CCXS10], smart water systems [OUS+08], machine-condition mon-
itoring [LG09, KNS14], and smart power-grid systems [GLH10], Fig. 2.1 illustrates an example
of NDSS in a smart grid system. As can be seen, NDSSs consists of spatially distributed
autonomous sensors nodes, which can dynamically collect real-time and comprehensive infor-
mation from environments in real time. These sensor nodes are connected by information and
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communication technology (ICT) infrastructures, such as wireless communications. Through
these ICT infrastructures, sensor nodes are able to communicate with each other and send their
measurements back to base stations (e.g. server and perhaps laptop class devices) for further
analysis.
National-wide Smart Grid
Smart Meter Smart Meter
Local- Smart Grid
Local Bulk GeneratorsEnergy Energy 
Energy Transmission Lines Cyber LinksDemand NodesSupply Nodes
Figure 2.1: The conceptual illustration of a smart grid system.
With NDSSs, we are able to collect measurements from large-scale deployed sensors in real
time. In cyber-physical systems, this enables the possibility to realise, perhaps even nation-
wide, real-time control systems. Let’s again take smart-grid system as an example, the data
collected by NDSSs allows information systems to perform prediction analysis, which balances
the power production and consumption in the grid system through smart pricing techniques.
Therefore energy distribution (which controls the energy generation, consumption, and trans-
mission process) can be performed in a more dynamic and eﬃcient manner [MKB+12, LNR11].
In the Internet of Things (IoT) and smart monitoring systems (e.g. agriculture and structural
health monitoring), the comprehensive information provided by NDSSs allows us to access and
better understand complex residential behaviours and environments, respectively. This can
potentially help to solve diﬃcult problems, such as the virus spread or the correlation between
water, power and food production, which is very diﬃcult to answer without fine-grained analytic
data.
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2.1.1 Limitations and Challenges in Real-World NDSSs
Although NDSSs have been widely adopted in many real-world applications, they still suﬀer
from various limitations and technical challenges [GH09] which can be summarised as follows:
• Resource-limited and unreliable sensor nodes: In order to realise large-scale cost
eﬀective and sustainable deployments, NDSSs typically consist of resource-limited sensor
nodes. These sensor nodes are usually powered by batteries or can be charged by energy
harvesting components (e.g. solar panels). Due to the limited energy supply, these sensor
nodes are typically constructed with micro-electro-mechanical-based sensors and micro-
controllers to reduce their sizes and power consumption. Thus, complicated algorithms
(e.g. video streaming) that perform well on traditional PC environments may not be di-
rectly adoptable in NDSSs. Furthermore, to reduce deployment costs, many sensor nodes
are typically constructed with low-cost components without comprehensive protection.
Consequently they are prone to unexpected faults.
• Limited communication capacity: In NDSSs, radio-frequency (RF) modules and
network interface controllers (NICs) are the most power consuming components of the
sensor node. Performing data analysing task with such devices in a centralised manner
can be very expensive since all sensor measurements are required to be sent back to data
sinks. Therefore, it is preferable to push the data analysing task to the edge of the network
(i.e. each sensor node) in a distributed manner, where analytical data is first extracted
from the raw data by light-weight algorithms to reduce its size before sent back to base
station for further analysis. This edge analytics can also drive local control decisions.
With this design, the size of data needed to be transmitted back can be significantly
reduced.
• Heterogeneous and dynamic environmental condition: NDSSs can be deployed
in heterogeneous environments where the environmental condition, surrounding physical
phenomena, and sensor types can have totally diﬀerent properties. Therefore, it can
be diﬃcult to transplant a given algorithm from one NDSS to another since the basic
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assumption of such algorithms may no longer hold in the new environment. This problem
become even more severe due to the proliferation of CPS and IoT applications, where
the consulting information that helps to identify environmental conditions from domain
experts may longer be available. Furthermore, environments are usually non-stationary
[OGIR14]. Even one can find an assumption that perfectly reflects the current state
of the environment, unexpected changes may still occur and therefore change the entire
behaviour of NDSSs and their sensor measurements.
• Large-scale deployment and potential ad-hoc architecture: NDSSs nowadays
contains a large number of sensor nodes (e.g. thousands or more). Network connec-
tions therein are established through autonomous procedures since the topologies of such
systems are typically not predefined and can change overtime due to unstable network
connectivity. Therefore, scale-sensitive algorithms (i.e. the complexity grows with regard
to the network size) that where developed for traditional sensor and computer systems
may no longer be applicable in NDSS. New solutions that can dynamically adapt to
diﬀerent scales and changes are required for NDSSs.
2.2 Spatiotemporal Correlation in NDSSs
Spatiotemporal correlation is a natural property that exists in almost every physical phe-
nomenon, including temperature, humidity, illumination, mechanical vibration, sound, gas
concentration, radiation, and even human behaviours [BDOS01, DD11]. Since NDSSs are
designed to measure these physical phenomena, their measurement should reflect this corre-
lation. In this section, we are going to discuss the property of this correlation with formally
mathematical formulations.
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2.2.1 Spatial Correlation
In NDSSs, sensor measurements are simultaneously influenced by the physical phenomena of
its surrounding environments. To be more specific, we consider a set of sensors S that can
communicate with other nearby sensors through wireless or wired communications. Each sensor
i ∈ S is synchronised with others and monitors the same type of physical phenomena (e.g.
temperature), and periodically reports its measurement ri(t) at every time slot t = {0, 1, ...}.
The covariance function between sensor measurements and physical phenomena can be formally
defined as [BDOS01]:
ri(t) =
∑
j=1,2,··· ,n
Ej(t)
(kdi,j(t) + 1)α
(2.1)
where ri(t) denotes the reading of sensor device at location p at time t ; Ej(t) denotes the
value of j-th phenomenon source at time t; di,j(t) denotes the distance from i-th node to j-th
phenomenon source; k and α are parameters that determine the diﬀusion characteristic of j-th
phenomenon source.
As can be seen in this formula, sensor readings vary according to the distance between sensors
and phenomena sources, and the nature diﬀusion character of the phenomena. Fig. 2.2 illus-
trates an example between non-diﬀusive events and diﬀusive events. When the target events
are non-diﬀusive events, sensors at diﬀerent locations have the same readings. Distances be-
tween sensors and the event source do not influence their measurements. On the contrary, when
monitored events are diﬀusive, sensor measurements vary with the distance diﬀerences between
sensors and events. The farther the sensors are, the lower their readings.
It is not diﬃcult to observe from Eq. 2.1 that physical states Ej(t) pertaining to a given spatial
area can simultaneously influence the sensor measurements observed in that specific area. For
instance, a leakage of a water pipe can be detected by multiple nearby sensors. Therefore,
consider two sensors a and b in a correlated sphere, there should exist a correlation mapping
fi,j(t) from sensor i to j at a given time t can be defined as:
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Figure 2.2: An example of non-diﬀusive and diﬀusive environmental events.
fi,j(t) : Ri(t)→ Rj(t) (2.2)
where Ri(t) and Rj(t) represent the set of all possible readings of i and j respectively at time t.
In practice, fi,j(t) depends on two key factors: the status of the physical phenomena in which
we are interested (e.g. the geographical distribution and values phenomenon sources), and the
surrounding environment (e.g. background noise). For instance, a correlation mapping between
the readings of two temperature sensors should be simultaneously aﬀected by the nearby tem-
perature sources (e.g. heaters), and the surrounding air temperature. This correlation mapping
is typically termed spatial correlation.
It is worth noting that many previous approaches exploit the distances between sensors as indi-
cators of spatial correlation between sensors [YJXy11, XCWY08, Jia09, BR11, SCG10, BS10,
TS08, BK10]; however, distances cannot guarantee the existence of strong spatial correlation.
As the example depicted in Fig. 2.3, although the sensors in the same communication group
(where sensors are 1-hop communication neighbours) are spatially closer to their neighbours,
their measurements; however, are not strongly correlated due to the pipe, which completely
isolates sensor measurements in the pipe from the ones outside.
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Figure 2.3: An example of a sensor deployment in underground water pipe systems
2.2.2 Temporal Correlation
Temporal correlation illustrates the similarity between two random variables at two diﬀerent
points in time. In the natural environment, there are two diﬀerent forms of temporal correlation.
One is the continuity in physical phenomena where the current states of physical phenomena
should similar to their closely previous states. Since the measurements of spatially correlated
sensors are discrete readings reflecting the surrounding environmental physical phenomena,
the correlation mappings fi,j(t) of these sensors should also be temporally consistent to their
previous. To be more specific, mapping function fi,j(t) should be similar to previous mappings
fi,j(τ), τ ∈ [t − △t, t − 1], where sampling window size △t represents a time period during
which the physical dynamic patterns are stable.
To ensure this temporal correlation can be observed from sensor measurements, sample rate
is a crucial parameter. In theory, the sample rate must be as least two times higher than
the highest frequency component in the signal to ensure that the original signal can be fully
reconstructed from the discrete samples according to the NyquistShannon sampling theorem
[DWD+15]. Also, small time diﬀerences between two samples usually indicates there is a higher
probability a correlation can be found between two measurements [VAA04, DD11]. Therefore,
it is important to have a high enough sampling rate to ensures that important state transients
in which users are interested can be revealed.
Another form of temporal correlation is seasonal similarity. In natural environments, similar
pattern or fluctuations may be periodically observed over time, such as annual/daily temper-
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ature, heart beats in Electrocardiography (ECG), and stock market. The example in Fig. 2.4
illustrates this seasonality. As can be easily observed, similar patterns (or so call motif in time
series) occur overtime on a daily basis. Unlike previous form of temporal correlation, seasonal
similarity may not exist in all sensor measurements. They requires sophisticated analysis on
long-term monitoring data [YKM+07, MA´TRAR11, BK14], or knowledge from domain experts
to confirm their existences.
Figure 2.4: An example of an Italian power usage record [LK06] illustrates seasonal similarity.
2.3 Anomalies in NDSSs
Anomalies in NDSSs are abnormal behaviours that reveal changes in the NDSSs. They provide
insightful information that indicates the existence of faults (e.g. sensor failures [GZH09], and
false-data injections [IL15]), and events that newly occur in the monitoring environments (e.g.
fire occurrence and earthquake [BFH+12, FOT+13]). According to their causes, anomalies in
NDSSs can be classified into the following two categories:
• Data delivery failures are explicit anomalies where sensor readings do not reach data
sinks as expected. These anomalies are easy to observe when sensor readings do not
routed back as scheduled due to network congestion, ineﬃcient routing scheme, and device
failures (where readings in the memory are discarded) as illustrated in Figure 2.5. They
are typically easy to detect and be handled by robust routing and scheduling protocols.
This has resulted in more research on anomaly diagnosis and prediction on DDF, which
aims to ensure overall system stability.
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Figure 2.5: Causes of data delivery failures (DDFs).
• Abnormal data collections are implicit anomalies where sensor readings are inconsis-
tent with the expectation of users or systems. As illustrated in Fig. 2.6, they can be either
sensor node failures (e.g. hardware and soft defects) or environmental events. These re-
quire more sophisticated detection tools (such as statistical tests and machine-learning
classifiers) that help us to understand the diﬀerence between normal and abnormal. For
example, in the leakage detection of underground water systems, it is typically necessary
to learn the normal water behaviours before one can make assumptions distinguishing ab-
normal leakage from normal supply conditions. Since identifying such anomalies is a more
challenging task, in our research, we focus on detecting such abnormal data collections.
In this thesis, if not specified, we denote all anomalies as abnormal data collections.
2.3.1 Causes behind Abnormal Data Collections
According to their causes, anomalies in NDSSs can be mainly classified into the three following
categories:
• Sensor node or NDSSs failures are the anomalies that sensor measurements do not
reflect the true values of the surrounding environment or sensing target due to the failures
in sensing systems themselves. As Fig. 2.6 illustrates, these failures can be defects
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Figure 2.6: Causes of abnormal data collections (ADCs).
and bugs in both hardware devices and software application, respectively. In hardware,
they can be model defects, damages from environments, or insuﬃcient power supplies;
in software, they can be exceptions due to immature algorithm designs, or inaccurate
calibrations [UBH09]. Although there exist some counter examples (e.g. due to the same
battery power life), these type of anomalies usually only occur at single, or a few, nodes
at the same time.
• Environmental Events are genuine changes in the environments. They can cause
unexpected deviations (either in a rapid or gradual manner) in sensor measurements
or changes in spatiotemporal correlations. Diﬀerent from failures (which usually only
aﬀect one or few sensor nodes), environmental events typically result in changes in the
measurements of all spatially correlated sensors. According to users’ definition, these
events can be regarded as either novelties in which users are interested, or irregular
changes to which requires system to adapt.
• Malicious attacks are another type of anomalies. In real-world NDSSs, sensor nodes
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may be connected through open network interfaces where attacks may be launched by
operator counterparts to degrade the overall system performance. Among these attacks,
the the most typical one may be false data injection (FDI), where adversaries modify
data via compromising the measuring components [LNR11, LYY+12, XMS10]. This type
of anomalies can result in significant system performance degradation. For example, in
smart grids, when the state of the grid network is untruthful, the energy distribution
process may be disrupted. It is diﬃcult to distinguish these attacks from other two types
of anomaly without further diagnosis, as they may eﬀect multiple targets at the same
time.
2.3.2 Pattern of Abnormal Data Collections
According to our research, anomalies in NDSSs can result in the following three observable
changes (which are illustrated in Fig. 2.7) in sensor measurements:
• Rapid pattern changes: According to their granularity, this type of change can be
further classified into point deviations and contextual deviations [BMM14], as shown in
Fig. 2.7 (a) and (b), respectively. As can be seen, point deviations only occur in a very
short time period before they return back to normal. In contrast, contextual deviations are
constant pattern changes, which typically last for longer period of time. Both of point and
contextual deviations are relatively easy to detect as the original data pattern is suddenly
discontinued and therefore violates the temporal continuity discussed in Chapter 2.2.2.
• Gradual pattern changes: As shown in Fig. 2.7 (c), they are sensor measurements that
slowly deviate from their original pattern. They can either be caused by special type of
sensor failures such as low battery power, or more importantly, malicious attacks. To avoid
being detected, these malicious attacks slightly but surely cause sensor measurements to
deviate from their actual values over time. These pattern changes typically obey the
temporal continuity with respect to a short time period; therefore, more sophisticated
solutions are required to capture these long-term pattern changes.
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• Seasonal pattern changes: Fig. 2.7 (d) illustrates an example of this type of changes.
As can be seen, they violate the seasonal similarity in temporal correlation discussed
in Chapter 2.2.2. Compared to the aforementioned two type of changes, these changes
are even more diﬃcult to identify as they completely obey the temporal continuity, and
therefore require complicated detection schemes such as rare-motif detections proposed
in [KLF05, BK14] to identify. Our current solution cannot detect this type of anomalies;
they will, however, be our future work.
(a) Rapid pattern changes (point)
(b) Rapid pattern changes (Contextual)
(c) Gradual pattern changes
(d) Seasonal pattern changes
Figure 2.7: Examples of three anomaly patterns in NDSS sensor measurements, where red lines
illustrate the anomalous measurements.
2.3.3 Handling Abnormal Data Collections in NDSSs
Handling the aforementioned abnormal data collections in NDSSs is a complicated task. Fig.
2.8 illustrates a typical anomaly handling procedure in NDSSs.
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Figure 2.8: The Controlling Flow of Anomaly Management
As can be seen, anomaly detection is the initial step in this handling procedure. Only when
anomalies are detected, will the system start the diagnosing processes. For active diagnosing
mechanisms such as [WWD+12, MLH+13, SBD15a, SBD15b], this design can significantly
reduce unnecessary power consumption caused by the complex diagnosing processes (which
usually require additional wireless communications) since these active mechanisms will only be
triggered when anomalies occur. After the anomalies are diagnosed, the handling tasks can be
broadly divided into two diﬀerent control loops: sensor-failure handling and event handling as
to the cause of anomalies. Sensor-failure handling is a self-controlling loop that handles the
anomalies that caused by sensor node failures. System developers can either isolate anomalous
information that influenced by failures, or fix the failures with pre-defined anomaly recovery
procedures with either automatic implementations or human labors. Thus, NDSSs can maintain
their functionalities, and continuously provide valuable information to users and applications.
On the other hand, event handling is an environmental control loops that handles the anomalies
that caused by genuine environmental events. In this control loop, the system either updates
the current algorithm to adapt to these events, or tries to recovery the environmental conditions
via actuator networks.
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2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed networked distributed sensing systems (NDSSs) and their
limitations and challenges in real-world deployments, and formally defines the spatiotempo-
ral correlation (which exist in most of natural physical processes) in such systems. We then
classified anomalies occurring in NDSSs into two diﬀerent categories, that are, data delivery
failures and abnormal data collections, according to their causes. Since we focus our research
on detecting the later type of anomalies (i.e. abnormal data collection), we further studied the
typical patterns of these data anomalies. Ultimately, we concluded this chapter with a general
anomaly-management framework for NDSSs.
Chapter 3
Recent Research on NDSS Anomaly
Detection
Detecting anomalies in NDSSs has been a ever-lasting challenge in computer science. As we dis-
cussed in Chapter 2.3.3, it is a root of the anomaly handling procedure in NDSSs. Consequently
there exist a large body of study related to anomaly detection in NDSSs. [PP07] reviews the
anomaly detection techniques exploiting classic rule-based and statistical approaches; [CBK09]
studies recent anomaly detection techniques as per real-world scenario (e.g. cyber-intrusion de-
tection and industrial damage detection); [ZMH10, XHTP11] summarise the anomaly detection
approaches for resource-limited wireless sensor networks (WSNs); [CBK12] and [BGS+13] fo-
cus on identifying anomalies in discrete sequential data, and in-network solutions, respectively.
Most recently, [BMS14] studies more sophisticated solutions that can cope with complicated
intrusion behaviours, whereas [BMM14, OGIR14] review the state-of-the-art solutions that can
dynamically adapt to changes in non-stationary environments.
Anomaly detection in NDSSs is essentially a classification task (where measurements or sensors
are classified into normal or anomalous), which can be summarised with the high-level proce-
dure illustrated in Fig. 3.1. This procedure typically consists of two diﬀerent phases: feature
extraction and anomaly classification. In the feature extraction phase, raw sensor measurements
are pre-processed to extract meaningful features. These feature-extraction procedures can be
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regarded as functions that map raw sensor measurements from their original value domain to
feature domains (which are typically at lower dimensionality). For example, [KYM14] regards
the compression rates of a lossless compression scheme as the feature that can be examined
with statistical tools. This extraction process does not only improve the accuracy of anomaly
detection due to data cleaning, but also reduces the size of data needed to be transmitted
(which is an ideal property for resource-limited NDSSs). In the anomaly classification phase,
raw measurements and extracted features are exploited to establish models that represents the
norms (and sometimes the anomalies)[LLL10]. With these models, anomalies can therefore be
distinguished from the norms with thresholds, which can be either computed by the classifier of
given by users. Ultimately, the detection results can be fed back to the modelling procedures
to improve the overall detection accuracy and adaptiveness.
Anomaly Detection Results
Feature Extraction
Raw 
Measurements
Anomaly Classification
Modeling the norms 
(and the anomalies)
Features
Finding or assigning 
classification thresholds 
Feedback results
Figure 3.1: The anomaly detection schemes for NDSSs typically consist of two components,
feature extraction and anomaly classification.
In the following of this chapter, we are going to first introduce the feature-extraction tech-
niques that are adopted by recent anomaly detection approaches, in Chapter 3.1. The recent
approaches of anomaly classifiers will be discussed in Chapter 3.2.
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3.1 Feature Extraction Techniques for Anomaly Detec-
tion
In data mining, feature extraction is a typical data pre-processing procedure. Given a mapping
function, they translate raw data from the original spaces into feature spaces which typically
have lower dimensions Applying such data preprocessing procedure can signicantly improve
the eﬃciency and quality of overall NDSS data analytics, such as computational overhead
reduction caused by dimensionality reduction [vdMPvdH09], and accuracy improvement due
to data cleaning [Tan14]. Therefore, although not explicitly mentioned, these techniques are
usually adopted in many anomaly detection approaches. Fig. 3.2 summarises the feature-
extraction techniques that have been adopted in recent NDSS anomaly detection approaches.
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Figure 3.2: Feature extraction techniques for anomaly detection.
• Principle components analysis (PCA)
PCA is one of the most widely adopted feature extraction techniques in anomaly de-
tection. It uses orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations into a set of
linearly uncorrelated variables named principal components, of which the most of varia-
tion information has been preserved in the first few principal components [FRM94]. In
[CPBN10, LA10, ZZY+10], each sensor detects anomalies by examining whether the sim-
ilarity between current principal components is consistent to their previous. [YxXgJ11,
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XCZ12, CWT12] further extend the PCA-based approach to the network level, providing
network-level anomaly conditions. In these approaches, when anomaly are indicated at
the network level, spectrum-based schemes (e.g. wavelet analysis) is performed over the
whole network to locate where these changes occur.
• Spectrum transformations
Spectrum transformation techniques transform sensor measurements from their original
value forms into frequency distributions with respect to certain basic sinusoid (e.g. co-
sine). These techniques are able to capture the major frequency components of sensor
measurements by using only few frequency signals which have the highest energy densities
to approximate the original measurements.
Among all the transformation techniques the most classic one is the discrete Fourier
transform (DFT)[FRM94]. DFT converts a finite list of sensor measurements into a
complex-valued function of frequency, where real value represents the amount of that
frequency present in the original function, and complex argument is the phase oﬀset
of the basic sinusoid in that frequency. Discrete cosine transform (DCT) [KJF97] is
another form of DFT but only use the real values of the transformation results (i.e. it
neglects the basic sinusoid oﬀset). However, although widely used, the aforementioned
two techniques can sometimes be limited due to the lack of time (or location) information
in their representations [CF99]. This can be a drawback for NDSS anomaly detection as
these frequency features lose some part of their temporal information.
To overcome this problem, some approaches exploit discrete wavelet transformation (DWT)
[CF99]. Unlike DFT and DCT, it decompose data into certain orthonormal series gener-
ated by a wavelet. The key advantage DWT has over DFT and DCT is that it captures
both frequency and time (or location) information, providing further measurement details
to anomaly classifiers. However, in order to store the time information, DWT typically
requires much higher storage then DFT and DCT. Also, selecting a proper wavelet that
maximises the preserved information can be a diﬃcult task. Among all wavelets, the
Haar wavelet has been widely adopted in many recent anomaly detection approaches
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[YxXgJ11, CWT12] due to its simplicity. Other spectral approaches such as Chebyshev
Polynomials [CN04a] can also be used to extract features.
• Piecewise polynomials
Piecewise polynomials are very eﬀective tools to summarise the average value or trends of
sensor measurements inside a piecewise time window. For computational simplicity, the
most widely adopted solutions are 0-order polynomials (e.g. piecewise aggregate approxi-
mation (PAA)[KCPM01a]), and 1-order polynomials (e.g. piecewise linear approximation
(PLA) [CCL+07]). For example, given a piecewise data, [UBH09] exploits 0-order poly-
nomials (i.e. a constant number) to compute the average of this data, whereas [YSGG10]
uses 1-order polynomials (i.e. a linear function) to capture the trend of such piecewise
data. Compared to previous two features, they are relatively easier to compute, however,
the they can be less descriptive when cope with highly fluctuated data as they neglect all
the fluctuations therein.
• Time series extrema
Time series extrema is a widely used feature to summarise time series data. These tech-
niques extract features by applying kernel-function filters (e.g. Gaussian filter) on the
original time series, and subsequent thresholding to identify robust extrema. Since sen-
sor measurements are essentially time series, these techniques can be used to summarise
the overall behaviour of these measurements. Compared to aforementioned solutions,
they are more robust against data distortions in practical scenarios [VMB13]; however,
they require thresholds to identify robust extrema, and cannot guarantee the amount of
dimensionality reduction (i.e. the memory needed for storing such features cannot be
predefined).
• Other features
Apart from the above feature extraction techniques that are commonly seen in recent
approaches, a large body of diﬀerent features can also be found in the application of
anomaly detection. For example, [KI04] exploits the statistical properties of raw mea-
surements; [CK10, KYM14] exploit the compression rates of lossless data compression to
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detect anomalies; [GZH09] transforms measurements from spatial correlated sensors into
number of sequences; and [CGSL14] exploits entropy in information theory to detection
anomalous behaviours. These features usually based on more rigid assumptions, which
limit their generality; however, they can provide very accurate results when the deployed
scenarios complying with their assumptions. Other feature extraction techniques, such as
symbolic aggregate approximation (SAX) [LKWL07]), although have yet seen in recent
NDSS anomaly detection approaches, also have great potential.
3.2 Anomaly Classifiers
Anomaly classifiers are the core of anomaly detection schemes. They distinguish anomalous
features (or sometimes raw measurements) from the norms. According to their adopted anomaly
classifiers, recent approaches can be roughly classified into three diﬀerent categories, rule-based,
statistical, and machine-learning approaches, as depicted in Fig. 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Taxonomy of recent anomaly detection approaches as per anomaly classifier.
It is worth noting that although we classify recently approaches according to their anomaly
classifiers, many of recent approaches can actually fall into multiple categories. For example,
the anomaly detection scheme proposed in [LA10] can be regarded as both semi-parametric
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statistical and semi-supervised approach as it assumes principle components are Gaussian dis-
tributed, while updating these principle components with online training schemes. Note that
we do not specify the overheads of diﬀerent classifiers in this section as they are mostly light
weight for NDSSs to compute. Furthermore, the overheads of these approaches typically due
to the implementations and feature extraction techniques they adopted rather than the type
of classification techniques. For example, using the same type of statistics-based classifier, a
centralised approach typically incur higher computation and communication overhead than to
the system than distributed solutions as sensor measurements are required to be sent to a single
data sink to infer anomalies.
3.2.1 Rule-Based Approaches
Rule-based approaches base their classification schemes on predefined static rules [Fra90]. Once
measurements or sensor behaviours violate these rules, these measurements or sensors are de-
clared anomalous. For instance, REDFLAG [UBH09] using five diﬀerent rules illustrated in
Fig. 3.4 to identify anomalies. Each rule requires at least one user defined threshold, given
by domain experts based on their prior knowledge to the environment and NDSSs. The clas-
sification results from each rule are than accumulated and draw to a conclusion with an OR
operation (i.e. if any one of the rules is violated, these measurements are regarded anomalous).
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Figure 3.4: The five rules in the rule-based anomaly detection approach: REDFLAG [UBH09].
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Rule-based approaches has been widely employed in many practical applications such as [LPSM07,
ZZG+09, UBH09] due to their simplicity. They are lightweight and can typically be computed
in a fully distributed manner, which introduces very little overhead to the system. This advan-
tage allows them to be easily deployed on resource-constrained NDSS sensor node. Having say
that, the detection accuracies of rule-based approaches can sometimes be undesirable as they
make rigid assumptions in their rules and uses static thresholds. For example, in [UBH09],
the experiment results show that more than 40% anomalies cannot be detected under certain
circumstances due to ineﬀective thresholds. Unfortunately, finding rules and thresholds equally
eﬀective in all scenarios can be a very diﬃcult task. Even one can find appropriate setting for
a given NDSS, since these rules are static, they cannot dynamically adapt to changes in the
NDSS and its surrounding environment, and therefore may not be as eﬀective over time.
Some other approaches apply rule-based schemes on extracted features. For example, [CPBN10,
LA10, ZZY+10, YxXgJ11] use PCA and DWT techniques to extract features, while using static
threshold to distinguish anomalous features from the norms. Compared to the aforementioned
rule-based approaches, they are more sophisticate and can provide higher detection accuracies
as the raw data has been preprocessed with their feature extraction schemes; however, they can
still suﬀer the same limitations caused by static rules and thresholds.
3.2.2 Statistics-Based Approaches
Statistics-based approaches regard the measurements of each sensor as a random variable that
follows a certain probability distribution [ZHM+12]. Based on this probability distribution,
at each time interval, a hypothesis can be made from either prior sensor measurements, or
other spatially correlated sensors. Eventually, given statistical thresholds (e.g. p-value), if
the diﬀerence between the current model and the hypothesis is smaller than these thresholds
(i.e. the statistical properties of current measurements are consistent with the hypothesis),
these measurements are classified as normal, otherwise anomalous. Compared to rule-based
approaches, statistical approaches can better response to the heterogeneous and dynamic nature
of NDSSs since property of these statistic thresholds are well studied and typically provide
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probability guarantees.
Recent statistics-based approaches can be broadly classified into parametric, non-parametric,
and semi-parametric, as per assumption on the data probability distribution [CBK09]. Para-
metric approaches assume that the data has come from a certain type of probability distribution
that is predefined by the users and make inferences about the parameters of such distribution.
In contrast, non-parametric solutions do not take a predetermined form but is constructed
according to information derived from the data; whereas semi-parametric approaches use para-
metric models in functional forms.
• Parametric Approaches In statistics, the most commonly used model is Gaussian
distribution (also known as normal distribution)[KI04, SCG10, DD11, FOT+13]. This
model is remarkably useful as it provides central limit theorem, which can be widely
observed in many natural environments and human behaviours. Chi-square models are
also used in some recent approaches such as the compressive sensing scheme proposed in
[BPLV09]. Due to their simple assumption, these approaches are usually lightweight and
provides reasonably accurate detection results in most of general situations. However,
they can be less accurate with small sample sizes or in non-stationary environments.
Regression models are also widely adopted in many parametric approaches. They as-
sume that sensor measurements come from certain polynomial functions (e.g. linear
function), and use parametric models (e.g. Gaussian distribution) in functional forms
to distinguish between anomalies and norms. For instance, [YJXy11] assumes that the
correlation mapping from one sensor to another is a 1-order polynomial function and uses
Gaussian distribution to model the variation of this linear function. [IL15] further extend
this assumption with an adaptive weighting function, which can be recursively updated
with previous detection results, to improve overall detection accuracy. [FD15] propose
a fully distributed solution which assumes physical phenomena are multivariate autore-
gressive (AR) processes. With this assumption, it exploits conjugate Bayesian learning to
model the value range of trustworthy sensor measurements which lie in a given probability
intervals.
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Compared to parametric Gaussian or Chi-square models, regression models potentially
provide more insightful detection results as polynomial models exploit the spatiotemporal
correlation between sensors. However, as a tradeoﬀ, they are typically more expensive to
compute. Also, they are normally based on specific polynomial functions which may not
hold true in practice and need to be known in advance.
• Non-Parametric Approaches Non-parametric approaches do not assume the underly
distribution of sensor measurements [Esk00]. They learn the distribution form histori-
cal data. Therefore, these approaches are more capable to cope with changes and het-
erogeneities in the environments. In these approaches, histograms and kernel density
functions are typically exploited to establish the missing distribution model. For exam-
ple, [SPP+06] learns the data distributions with kernel functions to detection distance
and density-based anomalies; and [Agg05] uses histogram-based schemes to capture the
underly distribution of normal readings.
Although these approaches are advanced in terms of adaptability, they usually require
larger sample size then parametric solutions when establishing distribution models. Also,
assigning eﬀective thresholds to such approaches can be diﬃcult since the property of
newly established distribution is unknown. Therefore, further assumptions or prior knowl-
edge are needed to achieve better detection accuracy. For example, [KBD13] proposes a
novel solution where possible verify nodes (PVNs) were selected (with the consideration
of routing eﬃciency) to validate the trustworthiness of the measurements of a given sensor
by examining their statistical properties with histograms. However, it does not only make
strict assumptions regarding the covariance function of physical processes (i.e. they are
non-diﬀusive in close area), but requires application specific user-defined parameters (e.g.
histogram width).
Some graph-based approaches are regarded another a type of non-parametric solutions
[NC03], where spatially correlated sensors and the property of their correlation mappings
are regarded as nodes and edges in a graph. Among all graph-based approaches, voting
schemes [TS08, BS10] are the most widely adopted techniques as they are very lightweight
to compute and provides theocratical accuracy guarantees. For example, [CKS06] pro-
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poses a distributed fault detection (DFD) voting scheme to detect anomalies. According
to their analysis, when a network has more than 7 sensor nodes, the detection accuracy
of DFD can achieve more than 98% with 20% sensor fault probability. This approach
has inspired number of similar DFD-based approaches [XCWY08, BK10], each improv-
ing detection accuracy with network clustering techniques. Also, based on DFD [Jia09]
proposed a new voting scheme which further improves the detection accuracy. However,
although these voting-based approaches seems to avoid the aforementioned problems,
their accuracy can still be limited due to their naive and parametric edge calculation.
• Semi-Parametric Approaches
To overcome the aforementioned drawbacks, some approaches try to achieve more bal-
ance solutions by using parametric models in functional forms, that is, assuming ex-
tracted features follow certain probability distributions. For example, [KYM14, YSGG10]
assume that the compression rate of lossless compressions are normal distributed; PCA-
base [XCZ12, CWT12] and piecewise-polynomial-based [YSGG10] approached assume
their features follows Gaussian distribution. Some graph-based approaches (e.g. [FD14,
YAWS15] base on autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) technique) can also
be classified as semi-parametric as they adopt parametric models to compute the edges
in the graphs, and use voting schemes to finalise their detect results. Other approaches
which make relatively loose assumptions on the correlation function between physical phe-
nomena and sensor measurements can also be classified as semi-parametric approaches
as they assume the correlation mappings have certain property without specifying their
forms. For instance, [GZH09] assume that sensor measurements (e.g. acoustic volume
and thermal radiation) attenuate over distance between sensors and physical phenom-
ena increase; [YSLY11] assume that physical phenomena propagate through out an area
overtime.
Overall, semi-parametric approaches are comparatively more flexible and accurate then
pure parametric and non-parametric solutions as functional parametric models and loose
assumptions help to improves the overall detection accuracy without making rigid as-
sumption on the overall data distribution. It is worth noting that our approaches fall into
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this category.
Compared to rule-based approaches, statistical approaches are typically more flexible and adap-
tive; however, their detection accuracy still depends on carefully given thresholds. Undesirable
thresholds may increase the possibility of false detections. Fine tuning these thresholds can be
a complicated task (especially for parametric and non-parametric varieties). Therefore, some
approaches utilise machining-learning techniques to overcome such problem.
3.2.3 Machine-Learning Approaches
As we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, anomaly detection is essentially a classifi-
cation problem. Since classification is a widely studied topic in machine learning, there exists
a large body of research who realise their anomaly detection schemes with machine-learning
techniques. As illustrated in Fig. 3.3, these machine-learning approaches can be classified into
three categories: supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised approaches.
• Supervised Approaches
Supervised approaches adopt non-parametric machine-learning techniques which do not
assume any data or feature distribution. The classification model and thresholds are
solely learnt from historical data with the ground-truth anomaly condition of each mea-
surements provided. In this category, we have seen a large body of approaches base
their detection algorithm on support vector machine (SVM) [OGIR14], neural network
[HHWB02, OWP08],and Bayesian algorithms [KI04, SM04, DS07]. Besides, some rule-
based and clustering-based approaches in which thresholds and cluster anomaly condition
are learnt from training data, respectively, can also fall in this category [BMM14]. With
enough number of training data, these approaches can provide exceptional detection ac-
curacies while remaining adaptive and general. Many of them further update their mod-
els in real-time and dynamic adapt to changes in non-stationary environments overtime
[OGIR14]. Compared to statistical and rule-based approaches, these approaches are more
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capable to cope with changes and the heterogenous nature of real-world NDSSs as they
waive the need predefined parameters and thresholds.
However, these approaches typically introduce significant computational and communica-
tion overheads to real-world NDSSs. Although some recent approaches (such as [OWP08])
tried to reduce these overheads with distributed designs, where anomalies can be detected
at the network level, the extra communication overhead is non-negligible. More impor-
tantly, supervised approaches require each sensor and its measurements to be tagged
with ground-truth anomaly conditions, which are usually not readily available in real-
ity. Even one may argue that these ground truths can be provided by domain experts,
acquiring such information can still be unrealistic in large-scale complex CPS or IoT sce-
narios. Without reliable ground truths, these supervised approaches cannot be deployed
in real-world NDSSs.
• Semi-Supervised Approaches
Since the ground-truth anomaly conditions are usually not available in real world, some
approaches adopt semi-supervised techniques as their classifiers. Unlike supervised learn-
ing, these approaches assume the whole training sets are normal (or anomalous in some
occasions). For example, PCA-based approaches [LA10] assume that all input data are
normal when initialising the models of norms. [CWT12, JFH13] further extend this ap-
proaches to recursively update the models with normal measurements overtime. It is
worth mention that some statistical approaches can also be classified semi-supervised ap-
proaches as those approaches learn their models from spatiotemporally correlated data
which are typically regarded as the norms.
Compared to supervised learning, these approaches are more practical for real-world de-
ployment as they do not need the ground-truth anomaly conditions. The major drawback
of these approaches is similar to those of non-parametric and semi-parametric statistical
approaches. They requires user-given functional thresholds to distinguish anomalies from
the norms. However, if one can find proper functional thresholds that are commonly true
in general environments, these approaches can provide accurate detection results.
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• Unsupervised Approaches
Unsupervised approaches are essentially constructed with clustering algorithms. Diﬀerent
from supervised clustering approaches, who learn the anomaly condition of each cluster
from the ground truths, these approaches assume that anomalies should only exist in
sparse clusters, which represent the minority of the input data. According to their clus-
tering schemes, these approaches either exploit distance-based or density-base functions
to compute the distance between data instances [BMM14].
Regarding the clustering techniques, one the most widely used techniques is nearest-
neighbour (NN) clustering, including 1-NN, K-NN, and K-mean. For example, [EAP+02]
proposed a K-NN-based anomaly detection framework which can be adopted by resource
limited NDSSs; and [YSD15] exploit distance-based cluster techniques to identify anoma-
lies in binary sensors in smart home environments. [RLPB06, RLP14, WWD+12] furthers
extent these approaches with hierarchical designs. In these designs, each sensor node uses
distance-based K-NN algorithm to detect local anomalies. These anomalies are then sent
to their parents node to generate network-level consensus. [BGS+13] exploit similar tech-
nique but only exchanges local detection results between 1-hop sensor nodes to obtain
global agreements.
Unfortunately, as those semi-supervised approaches, functional thresholds are still re-
quired to distinguish the minorities from the others. For example, the cluster that contains
less then 5% of total measurements is classified as an anomalies cluster. Inappropriate
thresholds may cause false detections. Giving appropriate thresholds to these approaches
can be a diﬃcult task as those semi-supervised counter parts as no underly distribution
is assumed. Furthermore, these approaches may fail to detect anomalies when a massive
amount of changes occurs (e.g. environmental event or large scale attack) as they assume
that the minorities are anomalous.
Chapter 4
An Overview to Our Proposal
From the recent literatures studied in Chapter 3, we have yet seen any general solution that can
be readily applied on all NDSS environments since they are either simple but limited by rigid
assumptions, or powerful but complex not being suited to resource scares and large NDSSs. To
overcome these aforementioned problems, we propose a general and lightweight solution that
can detect anomalies in NISSs in a distributed manner.
In this solution, we firstly developed an anomaly classifier named general anomaly detection
(GAD) algorithm, which identifies the anomaly condition of each sensor measurement. It ex-
ploits a pairwise design, which models the spatial correlation between two neighbouring sensors,
to minimise the computational complexity introduced by the detection scheme. However, since
GAD exploits the spatial correlation between neighbour sensor nodes, it is essential to define
neighbours where such correlations exist among all sensors therein. To this end, we developed
a distributed matching-based grouping algorithm (DMGA). This algorithm clusters sensors in
a NDSS into groups where strong spatial correlations exist between neighbour sensors, while
allowing GAD to scale to diﬀerent sizes of NDSSs.
Now we faced another challenge. As one may be aware of, the above solution can only identify
rapid pattern changes as we discussed in Chapter 2.3.2. In order to identify gradual pattern
changes, one need to compare a relatively long-term pattern of sensor measurements. However,
storing, communicating raw sensor measurements can be less eﬀective and can incur significant
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communication and computation overhead to NDSSs. Therefore, it is ideal to process raw
data in each sensor locally before before sending them to other nodes for inferring anomalies.
To achieve this, we proposed two feature extraction techniques, MFDR and MFDR-N, which
extract certain number of representative features from a set of continuous sensor measurements.
Compared to traditional solutions, these two techniques further guarantee that errors between
features and raw data is minimised. With the features extracted with MFDR and MFDR-N,
we exploited the same framework of GAD and proposed FGAD and FGAD-N, respectively, to
detect those gradual-change anomalies.
4.1 Outline of our proposal
In this section, we outline our approach form the data-processing aspect. As illustrated in Fig.
4.1, this solution consists of three diﬀerent components:
1. A novel feature extraction method that can eﬀective preserve the most informative time-
series features in sensor measurements.
2. A lightweight distributed clustering algorithm that groups sensor nodes in a NDSS into
clusters where strong spatial correlations exist among all sensor nodes.
3. A light-weight anomaly classifier that can provide insightful anomaly detection results in
most of general NDSSs.
The detail of these three components is summarised as the followings:
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Figure 4.1: An overview of our proposed anomaly detection solution.
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• Multi-Feature Dimensionality Reduction (MFDR) Representation
To better describe these correlations while minimising the communication overhead, we
propose two dimensionality reduction (DR) techniques: MFDR and MFDR-N. These
two DR techniques extract three time-series features including trends, seasonal compo-
nents, and noise, from raw sensor measurements. Based on these features, we are able
to describe the spatial correlation between sensor nodes with more sophisticated non-
parametric measures such as Euclidean distance. This design not only can significantly
reduce the cost of communication and post data-mining procedure due to dimensionality
reduction, but also allow us to assess correlation between sensors with multiple analytic
features. Compared to other traditional DR techniques, this multiple features design
provides better descriptions that introduce lower error between DR representations and
the original sensor measurements. Consequently these representations can enhance the
accuracy of our clustering and anomaly detection algorithms (i.e. DMGA and GAD)
while reduce communication overhead introduced by them. Further details of MFDR and
MFDR-N will be given in Chapter 5.
• Distributed Maximum-Weighted-Matching-based Grouping Algorithm (DMGA)
As we discussed in 2.1.1, it is ideal to build our anomaly detection schemes in a distributed
manner (i.e. measurements are analysed locally without being sent back to base stations).
We achieve this by grouping sensors in into small correlation groups. In Chapter 6, we
propose a distributed matching-based grouping algorithm (DMGA), the first correlation-
aware grouping algorithm that clusters sensor nodes into small correlation groups where
sensor are strongly correlated in a fully distributed manner. This allows us to decompose
the anomaly detection problem into several sub-problems, which can be solved in each
cluster and is therefore independent of the scale of the NDSS. Therefore, we can adopt
more sophisticated anomaly classifiers (which typically incur more computational and
communication overhead) while remain lightweight. In addition, the overall anomaly
handling procedure can be more agile and robust against transmission delay and data
transmission failures, respectively, since the decision can be made locally.
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Compared to other recent approaches, DMGA is advanced as it ensures that strong spa-
tiotemporal correlations exist among all sensors in each correlation group. It guarantees
that the correlation between sensors in each group is larger than a certain threshold and
the overall correlation strength (which is a measure that reveals the degree of similar-
ity between the behaviours of two sensors) is sub-optimal. This guarantee ensures our
spatiotemporal-correlation-based anomaly classifier can remain eﬀective in all diﬀerent
NDSSs and environments. Further details of DMGA will be given in Chapter 6.
• General Anomaly Detection (GAD) Algorithm
Ultimately, we propose a general anomaly detection (GAD) algorithm. This algorithm
consists of three diﬀerent phases: pairwise correlation modelling, trust-based voting, and
event/anomaly classification. In the first phase, correlation models between sensors in
each correlation group are first computed from past measurements. If the correlation
mappings between newly arrived measurements violate these models, these correlations
are regarded untrustworthy, otherwise trustworthy. In the trust-based voting phase, a
two-round voting is performed to identify anomalous measurements. In this voting, If a
newly arrive measurement is regarded untrustworthy by the majority of neighbour, this
measurement will be marked unreliable and therefore regarded as an indication of anomaly
occurrence. Ultimately, a preliminary anomaly diagnosis is performed to distinguish
genuine environmental events from node anomalies (which are typically caused by node
failures).
With the above design, GAD is able to identifies the anomalies which results in rapid
pattern changes in measurements, and tag each sensor measurement with its anomaly
condition in real time. However, GAD cannot cope with the anomalies causing gradual
pattern deviations since the change in each time interval is so small that can be regarded
as normal variations in sensor measurements. To overcome this problem, we propose a
feature-based GAD (FGAD) algorithm. Unlike GAD, this algorithm computes correlation
models from our MFDR or MFDR-N features, which summarise the long-term trajectory
patterns of sensor measurements. Consequently these gradual deviations become percep-
tible in these features and therefore can be identified by FGAD. Both GAD and FGAD
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are very lightweight and can be easily computed by resource-limited devices. Further
details of GAD and FGAD will be given in Chapter 5.
4.2 To Operate Our Solution
To better understand how our solution operates in real-world NDSS, here we briefly illustrate
the operation of our solution. This operation can be mainly divided into three phases as shown
in Fig. 4.2.
• In the initialisation phase (0 ≤ t < tinit), each sensor node i ∈ S broadcast its
measurement at every time t to its one-hop communication neighbours, denoted asN 1-hopi ,
while accumulates these measurements in its memory.
• In the grouping phase (t = tinit), each sensor node i ∈ S compute MFDR or MFDR-N
features from the readings accumulated in the initialisation phase, than broadcast these
features to all of its one-hop communication neighbours. These features and the raw
measurement broadcasted in the initialisation phase are then used by our DMGA to
divide sensors in S into multiple correlation groups. After this grouping procedure, each
group chooses a sensor node as its cluster head. This cluster head can be selected using
diﬀerent ways, such as remaining battery energy, distance from gateway, or even simply
sensor ID.
• In the anomaly-detection phase (for every t ≥ tinit and tF ≥ tinit), each sensor i
sends its reading ri(t) and features fi(tF ) to its cluster head at every time t ∈ {tinit +
1, tinit+2, · · · } and tF ∈ {tinit+△t, tinit+2△t, · · · }, where △t denotes the piecewise time
window where measurements are summarised by MFDR or MFDR-N. When a cluster
head receives all sensor measurements and features from its group members, it identifies
the anomaly condition of each measurements and MFDR feature by using RGAD and
FGAD, respectively.
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Note that, although DMGA groups sensor nodes in to correlation groups, where sensor mea-
surements have to be first routed to cluster heads, users can still apply any network topol-
ogy, routing protocol, and data aggregation scheme, after measurements are tagged with their
anomaly conditions.
The details of our solution will be given in the following three chapters. Feature extraction
algorithms, MFDR and MFDR-N, will be presented in Chapter 5. Distributed matching-based
grouping algorithm, DMGA, will be presented in Chapter 6. Finally, the anomaly classifiers,
GAD and RGAD, will be presented in Chatper 7.
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Figure 4.2: Topology of the NDSS, and the overview of our proposal. (a) System topology
and the initialization phase where each node accumulates its reading and extract features
with MFDR t ∈ [0, tinit]. (b) Group establishment at t = tinit, including similarity measure
computation and DMGA for distributed grouping. (c) Anomaly detection phase, GAD and
FGAD, at every time slot t ∈ {tinit + 1, tinit + 2, · · · } and tF ∈ {tinit + △t, tinit + 2△t, · · · },
respectively, including correlation consistency assessment, measurement anomaly assessment,
and event and anomaly classication.
Chapter 5
MFDR:Multi-Feature Dimensionality
Reduction
5.1 Introduction
Time series data are generated from many application domains such as stock markets, medical
observations, and sensor networks. Given a distance measure, they provide insightful informa-
tion when data mining tools such as similarity search, clustering and other time-series mining
procedures are applied to such data. However, being of typically high dimensionality, they are
very expensive to deal with while in raw formats. Therefore, it is desirable to convert these time
series into lower-dimension representations while preserving their fundamental characteristics
[Fu11].
Many dimensionality-reduction (DR) techniques have been proposed including spectral trans-
formations (e.g. discrete Fourier transform (DFT)[FRM94]) wavelet (e.g. discrete wavelet
transform (DWT)[CF99]), principal component analysis (PCA)[FRM94], 0-order polynomi-
als (e.g. piecewise aggregate approximation (PAA)[KCPM01a], adaptive piecewise constant
approximation (APCA)[KCPM01b]), 1-order polynomials (e.g. indexable piecewise linear ap-
proximation (IPLA)[CCL+07]), and cardinality reduction (symbolic aggregate approximation
(SAX)[LKWL07]). These techniques reduce data dimensionality by either summarising the
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information contained in a given window (e.g. PLA), or extracting signals from representative
frequency spectrums (e.g. DFT).
However, previous literature shows that the aforementioned techniques are not equally descrip-
tive for real-world time series data[DTS+08, WMD+13]. For example, while spectrum-based
DFT is very eﬀective when being applied to periodically fluctuating data, 1-order polynomial
IPLA better describes trend-oriented time series data[WMD+13]. This is due to the fact that
each of these techniques has been designed to preserve certain features of the time series. There-
fore, if we exchange the two scenarios in the above example, the two techniques will produce
representations less representative of the time series.
Furthermore, with the proliferation of cyber-physical systems (CPS) [FJL+14] and the internet
of things (IoT) [GBMP13], where massive amounts of cross-disciplinary heterogeneous time
series data are now required to be processed together to infer potential new knowledge, choosing
an appropriate DR technique can be an even more diﬃcult task, since no (or limited) a priori
knowledge available. Even when one can choose a suitable DR technique from literature, the
resulting representations cannot eﬀectively describe all types of features, such as local trends,
periodic fluctuations, and noise, in the time series.
To overcome the limitations of traditional DR techniques, we propose a multi-feature dimensionality-
reduction (MFDR) technique. This technique utilises two DR techniques to describe two types
of time series component, i.e. local trends and periodically fluctuating seasonal components.
Since these DR techniques are optimal in describing the features of such components, MFDR
representations can better track the original time series. The example shown in Fig.5.1, shows
that with the same number of coeﬃcients (NoCs), MFDR yields a lower error between its DR
representations and the original time series, compared to other traditional solutions. Also,
since MFDR naturally uses two representations (i.e. local-trend and seasonal-component) to
summarise a time series, each of these representations can be exclusively processed by post min-
ing procedures as per applications, such as anomaly detection [FOT+13], sequence matching
[BK14], and clustering [DWD+15].
In addition to MFDR, we propose an alternative DR technique, named MFDR-N. Compared
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Figure 5.1: With the same number of coeﬃcients (i.e. N = 2) MFDR representations yield
lower representation error (ϵ) than PLA [CCL+07], DFT [FRM94] with a time series of 90-day
USD to EUR exchange rate closing prices.
to the standard MFDR, it further summarises noise, which can provide more accurate results
when computing the distance between DR representations from noisy time series data.
The contributions of our work are summarised below:
• We propose a multi-feature dimensionality-reduction (MFDR) technique. Compared to
other state-of-the-art solutions, MFDR produces smaller representation errors between
DR representations and the original time series while using the same number of coeﬃ-
cients.
• We propose a novel distance function that allows users to directly compute the distance
between MFDR representations stored in both time and spectrum domains, which origi-
nally cannot be merged without mapping DR representations into the original time-series
domain.
• By utilising the noise characteristics, we propose MFDR-N, a modified version of MFDR,
that can extract noise in the time series. This further improves accuracy when one
computes the distance between noisy time series data. A distance function for MFDR-N
is also formally proposed.
• We propose a novel noise decomposition algorithm, which contains an iteratively statis-
tical significance test, to compute the frequency threshold required by MFDR-N.
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Chapter 5.2 gives the preliminaries and related
work. Chapter 5.3 and Chapter 5.4 illustrate the detail design of MFDR and MFDR-N, re-
spectively. Experimental evaluations are presented in Chapter 5.5, and we finally conclude this
chapter in Chapter 5.6.
5.2 Preliminaries and Related Work
In this section, we provide the definition and notation that we use throughout this chapter in
Chapter 5.2.1. A brief introduction to time series decomposition from a statistical point of view
is given in Chapter 5.2.2. Recently proposed DR techniques and their limitations are discussed
in Chapter 5.2.3.
5.2.1 Definitions and Notations
Definition 5.1 (Time Series). A (discrete) time series
s := ⟨s1, s2, · · · , sm⟩
is an ordered set of m real-valued random variables, where sm is the most recent value.
Definition 5.2 (Subsequence). Given a time series s of length m,
s[i, l] := ⟨si, si+1, · · · , si+l−1⟩ ⊆ s
is denoted by a subsequence of s with length l (≤ m) of contiguous positions starting from
position i ∈ [1,m− l + 1].
Definition 5.3 (Energy Density). The energy density of time series s is defined as:
E(s) :=
1
m
m∑
i=1
s2i
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Definition 5.4 (Representation Error). The error ϵ between a dimensionality-reduced repre-
sentation r and its original time series s is defined as:
ϵ := E(s− s¯) = 1
m
m∑
i=1
(si − s¯i)2
where s¯ is the image of r mapped into the original time-series domain.
Definition 5.5 (Euclidean Distance). The Euclidean distance between s and sˆ is defined as:
Dist(s, sˆ) := ∥s− sˆ∥ =
√√√√ m∑
i=1
(si − sˆi)2
For simplicity, if not specified, all distance measures mentioned in the chapter are regarded as
Euclidean distance.
Although there exists many other distance measures such as elastic measures (e.g. dynamic
time warping (DTW) [BC94]), and other edit-distance-based solutions (e.g. LCSS[VKG02] and
ERP[CN04b]), recent literature shows that Euclidean distance is still very eﬀective compared
to those distance measures in the real-world scenarios[DTS+08, WMD+13].
5.2.2 Time Series Decomposition
In time series analysis, a time series can be regarded as the combination of a number of com-
ponent series, where each of these has its own behaviour[BD13, Cha13]. According to these
behaviour characteristics, a time series can be formally decomposed into four components:
• Local Trend is the combination of an intrinsically fitted monotonic trend, and cyclical
components that fluctuate non-periodically.
• Seasonal Component is the component series that reflects seasonality, where a similar
pattern of fluctuations periodically occurs, such as daily temperature and the heart beats
in Electrocardiography (ECG). Compared to cyclical components, their fluctuations are
more regular.
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• Noise is of serially uncorrelated random variables. Here we define noise as white noise,
where data points are Gaussian distributed with zero mean.
• Residual is the residual series after the other components have been removed. They
typically contain high frequency information which cannot be illustrated by the above
components.
To decompose these components from a time series can be a challenging task as they are
typically tightly coupled. Many solutions were proposed including statistical analysis (e.g. Au-
toregressive integrated moving average[GN14, WHLP07] and SLT[CCMT90]) frequency-based
filtering (e.g. discrete fourier transform (DFT)[RY14]), regression analysis[WHLP07], and em-
pirical mode decomposition (EMD)[HSL+98, WHLP07].
5.2.3 Dimensionality Reduction for Time Series
Dimensionality reductions (DRs) for time series are the techniques that reduce the number of
coeﬃcients representing a time series while preserving the fundamental characteristics of such
data. Given a time series s and a dimensionality reduction function DR(·), the dimensionality-
reduction representation of this time series is defined as sDR = DR(s), where the size of sDR
is much smaller than s (i.e. |sDR| ≪ |s|). These DR techniques are typically required to
provide a distance function (i.e. DistDR(sDR, sˆDR)) that users can use to infer the original
distance (i.e. Dist(s, sˆ)) between two time series from their DR representations, while yielding
a small error. Ultimately, these techniques do not only minimise the requirements of storing
and communicating time-series data but significantly reduce the computational complexity of
post data-mining procedures (e.g. indexing and similarity searching).
Many dimensionality reduction techniques have been proposed in the last decade. However,
from the past literature, we have observed that the eﬀectiveness of these solutions varies as
per real-world scenarios [DTS+08, WMD+13]. Two real-world examples in Fig.5.2 illustrates
this observation. In Fig.5.2 (a), while DFT [FRM94] can closely approximate the periodic
fluctuations with only 2 coeﬃcients, while PLA produces a higher representation error. In
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contrast, PLA [CCL+07] is superior in summarising trends in a series shown in Fig.5.2(b),
whereas DFT is not as eﬀective as PLA and our proposed solution, MFDR.
Figure 5.2: With 2 coeﬃcients, (a) DFT [FRM94] and MFDR are more descriptive than PLA
[CCL+07] of the StarlightCurve time series example (b) PLA and MFDR are more descriptive
than DFT of the CBF time series example.
Furthermore, the real-world time series can sometimes be more sophisticated than in our ex-
ample. They typically consist of the four time-series components (i.e. local trends, seasonal
components, noises, and residuals) [BD13, Cha13] as we discussed in Chapter 5.2.2. Even when
one can choose the best suited representation technique from the literature, this technique can
still be ineﬀective in describing some of the aforementioned components, especially local trends
and seasonal components, which typically are regarded as informative signals. Fig.5.1 illus-
trates an example of this argument. As can be seen, PLA and DFT cannot very well preserve
both trends and seasonal fluctuations, whereas our MFDR successfully describes both of these
components and yields much lower representation errors.
5.2.4 Problem Statement
Here we state the problem we are going to solve in the remainder of this chapter. Assume we
have a time series s (with size m). Given a user defined number of coeﬃcients (NoCs) N , we
aim to propose a new DR technique that can simultaneously preserve multiple features of time-
series components. This DR representation (with size N) should generally yield the smallest
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representation error defined in Definition 5.4 compared to other previous work. Alongside this
technique, we aim to propose a distance function that can directly calculate the distance be-
tween two DR representations without them being mapped into the original time-series domain.
5.3 MFDR
As we mentioned in Chapter 5.2.3, each dimensionality reduction technique has its advantages
in dealing with a certain type of time series. Given a number of coeﬃcients (NoCs), DFT is
superior when representing periodic seasonal components while they are not eﬃcient enough
to illustrate trends; PLA cannot preserve fluctuations, but can successfully preserve trends.
By exploiting this observation, we propose a new multi-feature dimensionality reduction repre-
sentation, named MFDR, which can capture the merits of both DFT and PLA in a unified way.
As discussed in Chapter 5.2.2, we argue that a real-world time series smainly consists of two fol-
lowing components, local trends and seasonal components. With this argument, MFDR sophis-
ticatedly extracts and summarises these components by utilising two dimensionality-reduced
representations, including a 1-order polynomial (i.e. PLA), and a spectral transformation (i.e.
DFT). The definitions of these two representations are given below:
Definition 5.6 (Local-trend str). Given a time series s that has NTR numbers of PLA represen-
tations, ⟨(aj, b′j)⟩j=1,2,··· ,NTR, where aj and b′j denote the slope and constant of the representative
1-order polynomial in the j-th subsequence, respectively, we define the local-trend representations
TR(s, NTR) as:
TR(s, NTR) = ⟨(aj, bj)⟩j=1,2,··· ,NTR (5.1)
where bj is defined as:
bj = ajn(j − 1) + aj + b′j
Therefore, the image of TR(s, NTR) mapped into the original time series domain at index x can
be represented as:
sTR(x) = ajx+ bj if n(j − 1) < x ≤ nj and x ∈ N (5.2)
54 Chapter 5. MFDR:Multi-Feature Dimensionality Reduction
Algorithm 1: MFDR
Input : s : timeseries,
NTR: NoC for MFDR local trends,
NSE: NoC for MFDR seasonal components
Output: ⟨(aj , bj)⟩j=1,··· ,NTR ,
⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,··· ,NSE
1 ⟨(a1, b1), · · · , (aNTR , bNTR)⟩ ← TR(s, NTR)
2 sTR ← map ⟨(a1, b1), · · · , (aNTR , bNTR)⟩ into original domain
3 ⟨(c1,ω1,ϕ1), · · · , (cNSE),ωNSE ,ϕNSE⟩ ← SE(s− sTR, NSE)
4 return ⟨(aj , bj)⟩j=1,··· ,NTR and ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,··· ,NSE
Definition 5.7 (Seasonal-component sSE). Given a time series s and a NoC NSE, we define
the seasonal-component representations, SEorg(x,NSE), as:
SE(s, NSE) = ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,2,··· ,NSE (5.3)
where ci, ωi and ϕi are the amplitude, angular frequency, and phase shift of the i-th significant
seasonal component computed with discrete fourier transform (DFT), respectively. Since the
index of series starts from 1 rather than 0, ϕi is index corrected, that is, ϕi = ψi− ωi where ψi
is the phase shift i-th frequency signal directly from DFT. Therefore, the image of SE(s, NSE)
mapped into the original time-series domain at index x can be represented as:
sSE(x) =
NSE∑
i=1
ci cos(ωix+ ϕi) (5.4)
Algorithm 1 illustrates the detail design of MFDR. Given a time series s and a trend NoC,
NTR, MFDR first extracts local-trend representations TR(s, NTR) = ⟨(aj, bj)⟩j=1,2,··· ,NTR from
each subsequence s[j,m/NTR], where j are integers less than or equal to NTR. With TR(s, NTR),
local trends sTR are then removed from s. After removing local trends sTR from s, MFDR
further extracts seasonal-component representations, SE(s− sTR, NSE) = ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,2,··· ,NSE ,
which convey amplitude and frequency modulations, from the remainder series with a given
seasonal NoC, NSE.
Fig. 5.3 demonstrates an output series extracted by MFDR when NTR = 4 and NSE = 4.
As can be seen, since time series is essentially a sequence of discrete numbers, after applying
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MFDR, the output series can be divided into 4 discrete subsequences, which consist of both
MFDR trends and seasonal components. For example, in the 2-nd subsequence which indexed
from n + 1 to 2n, MFDR outputs a piecewise 1-order polynomial trend series sTR = a1x + b2
and a seasonal-components series sSE =
∑4
i=1 ci cos(ωix+ ϕi).
Figure 5.3: The top series illustrates the component series yielded by MFDR where NTR = 4.
The blue lines depict local trends, sTR; green lines depict seasonal components, sSE; and red
lines depict their combination, sTR + sSE. The bottom series give further details of trend,
seasonal component, and their combination within the second segment (i.e. j = 2).
It is worth mentioning that the order of applying TR(·, ·) and SE(·, ·) is crucial. Trends must
be removed from original time series before seasonal components are extracted. This is due
to the fact that local trends are essentially non-fluctuating components which typically spread
their energy among multiple frequency bands. Applying SE(·, ·) on a time series containing
such components can therefore result in less significant seasonal-component representations.
Regarding complexity, MFDR is very lightweight and storage friendly, as demonstrated in the
following two theorems.
Theorem 5.1. Given a time series s with m data points, the total computational complexity
of MFDR is O(m logm)
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Proof. As illustrated in Algorithm 1, MFDR consists of three functions: TR(·, ·), SE(·, ·), and
a time-series substraction. While TR(·, ·) and the time-series substraction requires O(m) oper-
ations to iterate through s, SE(·, ·) requires O(m logm) operations as it is implemented with
fast fourier transform (FFT). Therefore, the total computational complexity is dominated by
O(m logm).
Theorem 5.2. Given the number of coeﬃcients NTR and NSE, the total storage required by
MFDR is O(NTR +NSE).
Proof. As discussed above, ⟨(aj, bj)⟩j=1,··· ,NTR contains 2NTR values, while ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,··· ,NSE
contains 3NTR values. However, by storing ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,··· ,NSE in pure frequency space, where
frequency and phase shift are modulated and stored as a single variable, the storage cost
therefore can be reduced to 2NTR. Thus, the total storage complexity is O(NTR +NSE).
5.3.1 Find optimal NTR and NSE
MFDR requires two input NoCs, NTR and NSE, as stated in the previous section. As the
example shown in Fig. 5.4, with the same total NoC, diﬀerent NTR and NSE combinations can
yield diﬀerent results.
Figure 5.4: Applying MFDR with diﬀerent NoC combinations on a 90-day USD-to-ERU series
generates diﬀerent representations, among which the combination (NTR = 1, NSE = 3) results
in lower representation errors E(s− (sTR + sSE)).
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Algorithm 2: Find optimal NTR and NSE for MFDR
Input : time series s, NoC N
Output: NTR, NSE
1 err ←∞, NTR ← −1
2 for N ′TR ← 0, 1, · · · , N do
3 N ′SE ← N −N ′TR
4 if E(s− MFDR(s, N ′TR, N ′SE)) < err then
5 err ← E(s− MFDR(s, N ′TR, N ′SE))
6 NTR ← N ′TR
7 NSE ← N ′SE
8 return NTR and NSE
To select proper NTR and NSE for a given data set, empirical knowledge from domain experts is
usually necessary. Unfortunately, this knowledge may not be available in cyber-physical system
(CPS), Internet of Thing (IoT), and crowdsourcing scenarios, where time series are typically
dynamic and heterogeneous. Therefore, we formally formulate a scenario independent objective
function that finds the best NoC settings for MFDR below:
min E(s− (sTR + sSE)) (5.5)
subject to NTR +NSE = N
0 ≤ NTR ≤ N
0 ≤ NSE ≤ N
NTR ∈ N, NSE ∈ N
where E(s − (sTR + sSE)) equals to the mean square error (MSE) between original time series
s and MFDR series sTR + sSE.
Since E(s − (sTR + sSE)) is not a monotonic function with respect to the choices of NTR and
NSE, in this thesis, we solve Eq.(5.5) with a brute-force solution illustrated in Algorithm 2.
Fortunately, N is typically a small number that is independent of the length of time series
[Fu11, WMD+13], which allows our solution to remain scalable and therefore suitable for lower
resourced devices as found in CPS or IoT.
Here we present the computational complexity of the above solution.
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Theorem 5.3. Given a time series s and a NoC N , the computational complexity of Alg.2 is
O(Nm logm).
Proof. As to Theorem 5.1, we know the computational complexity of function MFDR(·, ·, ·) is
O(m logm). Since Alg.2 iterates through all the possibleNTR andNSE combinations, MFDR(·, ·, ·)
is required to be computed N times. Therefore, the computational complexity is O(Nm logm).
5.3.2 Calculate MFDR Distance
Unlike other representations, MFDR stores trends and seasonal components in two diﬀerent
spaces: time-segmented PLA space and spectral DFT space. This means that one cannot
compute the distance between two MFDR representations with solely traditional PLA or DFT
distance functions. Therefore, we formally define MFDR distance as below:
Definition 5.8 (MFDR distance). Given two time series s and sˆ, the distance between their
MFDR representations is defined as:
DistMFDR(s, sˆ) := ∥(sTR + sSE)− (ˆsTR + sˆSE)∥ (5.6)
However, using the above equation to compute the distance between two MFDR representations
can be meaningless as it iterates through every dimension of the original time series. To
overcome this problem, we propose a novel method to compute the MFDR distance function,
DistMFDR(·, ·). This method computes distance directly from dimensionality-reduced MFDR
representations, i.e. ⟨(aj, bj)⟩ and ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩, without the need to calculate str and sse at the
original time-series domain. Before introducing this method, we propose two lemmata as the
following:
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Lemma 5.1. The following identity holds
n∑
x=1
x cos(ωx+ ϕ) =
(n+ 1) sin
(
ω(n+ 12 +
ϕ
ω )
)− sin(ω2 + ϕ)
2 sin ω2
(5.7)
−sin
(
ω(n2 + 1 +
ϕ
ω )
)
sin nω2
2 sin2 ω2
(5.8)
Proof. Please see Appendix A.1.
Lemma 5.2. The following identity holds
n∑
x=1
cos(ωx+ ϕ) =
sin((n+ 1)ω2 )
sin(ω2 )
cos
(
2ϕ+ dn
2
)
− cos(ϕ) (5.9)
Proof. Please see [Lin01]
Having derived Lemma 5.1 and 5.2, we propose our method to compute DistMFDR(s, sˆ) in
Definition 5.8, as indicated below.
Theorem 5.4. Given two MFDR representations:
{⟨(aj, bj)⟩j=1,2,··· ,NTR , ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,2,··· ,NSE}
{⟨(aˆj, bˆj)⟩j=1,2,··· ,NˆTR , ⟨(cˆi, ωˆi, ϕˆi)⟩i=1,2,··· ,NˆSE}
and subsequence length n := ⌈ mLCM⌉ with LCM denoting the lowest common multiple of NTR
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and NˆTR, DistMFDR(s, sˆ) can be computed with the following equation:
DistMFDR(s, sˆ) =
LCM∑
j=1
NSE∑
i=1
(
△ajci
jn∑
x=1
x cos(ωix+ ϕi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lemma 5.1
−△ ajci
(j−1)n∑
x=1
x cos(ωix+ ϕi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lemma 5.1
+ △bjci
jn∑
x=1
cos(ωix+ ϕi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lemma 5.2
−△ bjci
(j−1)n∑
x=1
cos(ωix+ ϕi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lemma 5.2
)
−
LCM∑
j=1
NˆSE∑
i=1
(
△aj cˆi
jn∑
x=1
x cos(ωˆix+ ϕˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lemma 5.1
−△ aj cˆi
(j−1)n∑
x=1
x cos(ωˆix+ ϕˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lemma 5.1
+ △bj cˆi
jn∑
x=1
cos(ωˆix+ ϕˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lemma 5.2
−△ bj cˆi
(j−1)n∑
x=1
cos(ωˆix+ ϕˆi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lemma 5.2
)
(5.10)
where △aj = aj − aˆj, △bj = bj − bˆj.
Proof. To acquire Eq.(5.10), we first compute DistMFDR(s, sˆ) with Definition 5.8:
DistMFDR(s, sˆ) = ∥(sTR + sSE)− (ˆsTR + sˆSE)∥
=
√√√√LCM∑
j=1
jn∑
x=j′
(Pj(x) +Dj(x))2 (5.11)
where j′ = n(j − 1) + 1,
Pj(x) = ajx+ bj − aˆjx− bˆj = ∆ajx+∆bj (5.12)
Dj(x) =
NSE∑
i=1
ci cos(ωix+ ϕi)−
NˆSE∑
i=1
cˆi cos(ωˆix+ ϕˆi) (5.13)
In Eq.(5.11),
∑l
x=1(P (x) +Dj(x))
2 is the sum of the distance between the j-th pair of trend
segment from series s to sˆ. By expanding this equation, we have:
Dist2MFDR(s, sˆ) =
LCM∑
j=1
jn∑
x=j′
(P (x) +Dj(x))
2
=
LCM∑
j=1
jn∑
x=j′
Pj(x)
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dist2PLA(sTR ,ˆsTR)
+
LCM∑
j=1
jn∑
x=j′
D2j (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dist2DFT(sSE ,ˆsSE)
+2
LCM∑
j=1
jn∑
x=j′
Pj(x)Dj(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross-term
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where
∑LCM
j=1
∑jn
x=j′ Pj(x)
2 and
∑LCM
j=1
∑jn
x=j′ D
2
j (x) can be computed with Dist
2
PLA(str, sˆtr)
[CCL+07] and Dist2DFT(sse, sˆse) [FRM94], respectively, by definition.
By expanding the cross-term, we get:
LCM∑
j=1
jn∑
x=j′
(
∆ajx+∆bj
)(
ci
NSE∑
i=1
cos(ωix+ ϕi)− cˆi
NˆSE∑
i=1
cos(ωˆix+ ϕˆi)
)
=
LCM∑
j=1
NSE∑
i=1
(
△ajci
jn∑
x=j′
x cos(ωix+ ϕi) +△bjcsi
jn∑
x=j′
cos(ωsix+ ϕsi)
)
−
LCM∑
j=1
NˆSE∑
i=1
(
△aj cˆi
jn∑
x=j′
x cos(ωˆix+ ϕˆi) +△bj cˆi
jn∑
x=j′
cos(ωˆix+ ϕˆi)
)
Eventually, expanding the above equation produces Eq.(5.10).
The following theorem indicates the computational complexity of DistMFDR(s, sˆ) in Theorem
5.4.
Theorem 5.5. Given two time series s and sˆ and the number of coeﬃcients N , the computa-
tional cost of DistMFDR(s, sˆ) is bounded by O(N3/2) time.
Proof. As can be observed from Eq.(5.10), DistMFDR(s, sˆ) requires NTRNSE loops to iterative
through all trend segments and seasonal components. Therefore, the computational complexity
is simply O(NTRNˆTRNSE +NTRNˆTRNˆSE). Since N = NTR +NSE, in the worst case, we have
NTRNˆTRNSE +NTRNˆTRNˆSE
≤ NˆTR
(
NTR +NSE
2
)2
+NTR
(
NˆTR + NˆSE
2
)2
= NˆTR
N2
4
+NTR
N2
4
≤ 2N × N
2
4
≤ N
3
2
.
Thus, the computational complexity is O(N3/2).
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5.4 MFDR with Noise
In the previous section, we have proposed MFDR that minimises the error between a dimensionality-
reduced representation and its original series. However, we have not considered the existence
of noise as defined in Chapter 5.2.2 yet. Although noise is sometimes regarded as a disposable
component as it does not reflect an actual signal, they are not entirely meaningless. They do
contain energy, which contributes to the distance between the time series.
We argue that, since local trends and seasonal components typically span lower frequency spec-
trums [DWD+15], there exists a frequency threshold, τNO, separating pure noise components
from other signal components. With this argument, we propose MFDR-N based on the original
MFDR algorithm.
Algorithm 3 illustrates the MFDR-N algorithm. As can be seen, MFDR-N removes the signals
whose frequencies are higher than a threshold τNO before it extracts seasonal components with
SE(·, ·). Therefore, this high frequency noise is not considered during the extraction. At the
end of the MFDR-N algorithm, it returns one additional coeﬃcient eNO, which is the energy
density of this noise.
MFDR-N also provides its own distance function, as indicated below.
Theorem 5.6. Given two time series s and sˆ, whose MFDR-N representations are
{⟨(aj, bj)⟩j=1,2,··· ,NTR , ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,2,··· ,NSE , eNO}
{⟨(aˆj, bˆj)⟩j=1,2,··· ,NˆTR , ⟨(cˆi, ωˆi, ϕˆi)⟩i=1,2,··· ,NˆSE , eˆNO}
their MFDR-N distance function DistMFDR-N(s, sˆ) can be computed with:
DistMFDR-N(s, sˆ) =
√
Dist2MFDR(s, sˆ) +m(eno + eˆno) (5.14)
Proof. Since the noise of s and sˆ is defined as random variables that are normally distributed
with zero mean, they can be denoted by ξ(x) ∼ N (0, eNO) and ξˆ(x) ∼ N (0, eˆNO), respectively.
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Algorithm 3: MFDR-N
Input : s: time series,
m: length of s,
NTR: NoC for MFDR local trends,
NSE: NoC for MFDR seasonal components,
τNO: frequency threshold of noise
Output: ⟨(aj, bj)⟩j=1,··· ,NTR ,
⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,··· ,NSE ,
eNO: the energy density of noise
1 eNO ← 0
2 ⟨(a1, b1), · · · , (aNTR , bNTR)⟩ ← TR(s, NTR)
3 ⟨(c1,ω1,ϕ1), · · · , (c⌈m2 ⌉,ω⌈m2 ⌉,ϕ⌈m2 ⌉)⟩ ← SE(s− sTR, ⌈m2 ⌉)
// Remove signals whose frequencies are higher than τno
4 for i = 1, 2, · · · , ⌈m2 ⌉ do
5 if ωi ≥ τNO then
6 eNO ← eNO + c2i
7 ci ← 0
8 eNO ← eNO/m
9 ⟨(c1,ω1,ϕ1), · · · , (cNSE ,ωNSE ,ϕNSE)⟩ ← SE(sse, Nse)
10 return ⟨(aj, bj)⟩j=1,··· ,NTR , ⟨(ci,ωi,ϕi)⟩i=1,··· ,NSE , and eNO
Therefore, DistMFDR-N(s, sˆ) can be defined as:
DistMFDR-N(s, sˆ) = ∥(sTR + sSE + ξ(x))− (ˆsTR + sˆSE + ξˆ(x))∥
=
√√√√NTR∑
j=1
n∑
x=1
(Pj(x) +Dj(x) + ξj(x)− ξˆj(x))2
By expanding the above equation, we know
Dist2MFDR-N(s, sˆ) = Dist
2
MFDR(s, sˆ) +
NTR∑
j=1
n∑
x=1
(ξj(x)− ξˆj(x))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise-term
+ 2
NTR∑
j=1
n∑
x=1
(Pj(x) +Dj(x))(ξj(x)− ξˆj(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross-term
(5.15)
Due to normal distribution properties, we know that the expected value of the cross-term is
0 as Pj(x) + Dj(x) is not a random variable. Also, the noise-term ξj(x) − ξˆj(x) is a random
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variable that follows the normal distribution as defined below:
(ξj(x)− ξˆj(x)) ∼ N (0, eNO + eˆNO)
Therefore, the expected value of the noise-term is:
E
[ NTR∑
j=1
n∑
x=1
(ξj(x)− ξˆj(x))2
]
= E
[ m∑
y=1
(ξ(y)− ξˆ(y))2
]
= m(eNO + eˆNO) (5.16)
where m = nNTR. Eventually, replacing the cross-term and the noise-term in Eq.(5.15) with 0
and Eq.(5.16), respectively, produces Eq.(5.14) in Theorem 5.6.
5.4.1 Calculate the White Noise Threshold
Compared to standard MFDR, MFDR-N requires one extra frequency threshold, τNO, to sep-
arate noise from other components. However, this threshold is very diﬃcult to be directly
assigned by users without a priori knowledge of such series. Therefore, in this section, we
propose a solution to compute τNO from an input time series.
This solution first employs a time series decomposition technique, called empirical mode de-
composition (EMD), that decomposes a time series into a set of oscillatory component series
named intrinsic mode functions (IMFs). Once IMFs are acquired, a statistic-significant test is
applied to identify an IMF subset, whose combination is more likely to be consist of a white
noise. Ultimately, the lowest average frequency of the IMF in this subset is assigned to τn.
5.4.2 Empirical Mode Decomposition
Many time series decomposition techniques were proposed including statistical analysis (e.g.
Autoregressive integrated moving average(ARIMA)[GN14, WHLP07]), spectrum transforma-
tions (e.g. discrete fourier transform (DFT)[RY14], Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT)[RY14]),
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Figure 5.5: Using EMD to decompose a time series of four-day power usage yields 9 IMFs.
and regression analysis[WHLP07]. However, they can be less eﬀective in real-world scenarios as
they assume stationarity and linearity, which does not exist in the vast majority of real-world
data [WHLP07].
To avoid these drawbacks, we exploit empirical mode decomposition (EMD) [HSL+98, WHLP07]
as our decomposition technique. This technique has been widely used in many diﬀerent data
analysis areas such as de-trending [WHLP07], anomaly detection [FOT+13], and noise recog-
nition [WH04, WHLP07, CWZ+13]. Unlike the others, EMD does not require any priori
assumption. It is an intrinsic and adaptive solution that decomposes a time series into a set
of oscillatory component series, named intrinsic mode functions (IMFs), approximating the
original component series of the time series.
Fig.5.5 demonstrates an example of an EMD. EMD is realised by an iterative procedure called
the shifting process [HSL+98, WHLP07] as presented in Algorithm 4. The steps below give the
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Algorithm 4: EMD.
Input : time series s.
Output: total number of iterations K
IMFs of s at all iterations {IMF1, · · · , IMFK}.
1 Initialize k ← 1, r1 ← s
2 while rk is not monotonic do
3 envk ← get envelope of maximas of rk by cubic spline
4 envk ← get envelope of minimas of rk by cubic spline
5 rk+1 ← 12(envk + envk)
6 IMFk ← rk − rk+1
7 k ← k + 1
8 IMFk ← rk
9 return (K ← k) and {IMF1, · · · , IMFK}
high-level illustration of this shifting process:
1. The shifting process first sets an input time series s to the initial residual r0.
2. In the each iteration, it detects local maximas and minimas in r0.
3. Upper and lower envelopes are then formed by cubic-spline interpolation with these local
extremas.
4. The mean of these envelopes r1 is then removed from r0, deriving a IMF component:
IMF1 = r0 − r1.
5. r1 then takes the place of r0, and uses the mean r2 to generate the second IMF component:
IMF2 = r1 − r2.
6. This procedure iterates K times until a residual rK becomes monotonic, from which no
more IMF can be extracted.
With the aforementioned algorithm, the time series can be decomposed into intrinsic mode func-
tions {IMF1, · · · , IMFK}, where IMF1 describes the component series with the highest average
frequency, while IMFK illustrates the lowest-frequency monotonic component series. Theoreti-
cally, given a time series s, the number of IMFs, K, should be equal to the number of component
series of which s consists. Our experiment results in Chapter 5.5.3 also indicate that the number
of IMFs is independent of the length of the input series.
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5.4.3 White Noise Statistical Significance Test
Next we would like to find out the largest continuous set of IMFs whose combination is most
likely to be white noise, as the example illustrated in Fig. 5.6. In order to find out this
IMF set, we utilise the characteristics of white noise: the energy of every white noise IMF
follows χ2 distribution [WH04, WHLP07, CWZ+13]. With this characteristic, given a set of
IMFs {IMF1, IMF2, · · · , IMFK} and a probability bound, z , we are able to deliver an iterative
statistical significance test with Theorem 5.7 that exams whether each of these IMF is a white
noise component. As illustrated in Fig. 5.7, if the energy Ek and average period T¯k of IMFk lies
within the spread function Eq.(5.17), we say IMFk is a white noise component in this IMF set.
Figure 5.6: The iterative process.
Theorem 5.7. Given a normalised time series s, one can perform statistical significance tests
on each IMF of s to distinguish its white noise IMFs from others with an energy density spread
function Spread(x, y, z,m) illustrated below.
Spread(x, y, z,m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Signal, y > −x+ z
√
2
me
lnx/2
Signal, y < −x− z
√
2
me
lnx/2
Noise, else
(5.17)
where y = lnEk and Ek denotes the energy density of IMFk; and x = ln T¯k and T¯k denotes the
average period of IMFk; z is a user given parameter determining the deviation bound.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
It is worth noting that the average period of each IMF can be easily obtained by calculating
the number of zero crossings. Given an IMF, three zero crossings form a full cycle. Therefore,
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the average period T¯k of IMFk can be obtained with Eq.(5.18)
T¯k =
2m
# of zero crossings in IMFk
, (5.18)
Figure 5.7: The spread function of white noise.
With this spread function indicated in Theorem 5.7, we are now able to examine whether the
combination of a continuous IMF segment {IMF1, IMF2, · · · , IMFw} is white noise. We argue
that, given a continuous IMF segment, the higher fraction of white-noise IMF it contains, the
higher possibility the combination of this IMF segment is a genuine white noise. With this
argument, we propose an algorithm to find the longest continuous IMF segment that is the
most likely to be white noise.
Algorithm 5 demonstrates the detailed design of this algorithm. This algorithm first computes
T¯k and Ek for each IMF in IMF1, IMF2, · · · , IMFk, and K-1 numbers of partial-sum energy-
densities 1 Pk =
∑K
i=1Ek from IMF1, · · · , IMFk. After acquiring these values, it iteratively
examines each continuous-IMF segment IMF1 + IMF2 + · · · + IMFk using the energy-density
spread function illustrated in Eq.(5.17). Since we are to find the longest segment, the iteration
starts from the longest-segment combination IMF1+ IMF2+ · · ·+ IMFK . In each iteration, if the
1Note that the spread function in Theorem 5.7 operates with a normalised time series; therefore, energy-
densities are required to be normalised by the partial-sum energy-densities.
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new IMF segment contains a higher fraction of IMF regarded as white noise than the previous
candidate, we set the current IMF segment as the new candidate. This iteration terminates
when the white-noise fraction of an IMF segment is equal to 1 (i.e. the fraction of noise reaches
optimal), or k = 1 (i.e. no more IMF segments can be tested). Eventually, the filter returns
the lowest average frequency of the IMF, 1/T¯k, in this segment.
Algorithm 5: Iterative white noise examination test.
Input : s : timeseries
z: percentile of standard deviation,
τnoise.
Output: τNO.
1
[
K, {IMF1, · · · , IMFK}
]
← EMD(s)
2 Cmax ← τnoise, w ← 1, P0 ← 0, m← the length of s
3 for k ← 1, 2, · · · , K do // initialisation
4 T¯k ← |IMFk|/(# of zero crossings in IMFk)
5 Ek ← energy density of IMFk
6 Pk ← Pk−1 + Ek
7 for k ← K,K − 1, · · · , 2 do // iterative filtering
8 c← 0
9 for i← 1, 2, · · · , k do
10 if Spread(Ei/Pk, T¯k, z,m) then
11 c← c+ 1
12 if c/k = 1 then
13 Cmax ← c/k, w ← k
14 break
15 else if c/k > Cmax then
16 Cmax ← c/k, w ← k
17 τNO ← 1/T¯k
18 return τNO.
Two thresholds are required by this algorithm, i.e. z and τnoise. As we have discussed in the
beginning of this subsection, z is a constant number given by users. It decides the percentiles
of a standard deviation used in the statistical significance test. For example, z = 3 means that
99.73% of noise can be detected by the spread function. Another threshold τnoise defines the
minimum fraction of IMFs that contains white noise in an IMF segment, when declare sˆk as a
new candidate. It ensures that no false candidates are selected with actually a low white-noise
fraction. In this thesis, we set τnoise to 0.5 in our evaluation as this guarantees the majority of
IMFs in the candidate IMF segment is white noise.
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The complexity of this statistical significance test is O(Km). During the initialisation phase,
both T¯k and Ek require K×m operations to iterate through every IMF, while the partial-sum of
energy density Pk requires only K operations. Since K is essentially the number of components
in the time series, it can be regarded as a constant that is independent of the length of the time
series, m. The following filtering iterations need at most K(1 +K)/2 operations, which is also
independent of m. Since K is much smaller than m in most of general situations [HSL+98], the
overall computational complexity is O(Km).
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, three sets of experiments were performed to evaluate the performance of MFDR
and MFDR-N. The performance of MFDR is first evaluated with two measures including rep-
resentation error and closeness to original distance. Three traditional DR techniques including
IPLA, DFT, and PAA, are compared with MFDR and MFDR-N. Two input parameters of
MFDR, NTR and NSE, were obtained with Algorithm 2 proposed in Chapter 5.3.1 for every
time series. We then used MFDR as a benchmark to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of MFDR-N.
All the experiments were performed with 44 normalised real-world and synthetic data sets
[CKH+15]. Among the 44 data sets, four of them were specifically selected as examples in the
following subsections, as they all have very distinctive characteristics that cover a broad range
of applications. Example series from these four data sets are illustrated in Fig.5.8. As can
be seen, while ECG data contains bursty changes, SYM is more smoother and may contain
periodic fluctuations or local trends. In the meanwhile, CBF and CC data is generally a more
complex combination of all three types of time series components discussed in Chapter 5.2.2.
All simulations were run on a PC with Intel 8-core CPU, and 8 GB memory. All the algorithms
were implemented with Java SE 1.8.
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(a) Two example series of ECG data
(b) Two example series of CBF data
(c) Two example series of CC data
(d) Two example series of SYM data
Figure 5.8: The black lines illustrate the example series from four selected data sets, while the
red dotted lines illustrate the image mapping of MFDR representations with 4 coeﬃcients.
5.5.1 Representation Error
In this subsection, we study the representation error defined in Definition 5.4. 5 settings
of number of coeﬃcients (NoCs) (i.e. N = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) were used in this evaluation. The
experimental results are illustrated in Fig.5.9, where the error bars depict the variance of the
final results.
The experiments show that although DFT generally has quite competitive low representation
errors in this experiment, MFDR still has the lowest representation errors among all 44 data
sets. As illustrated in Fig.5.9(a), the average representation error of MFDR is 0.1187, 0.0230
and 0.3020 smaller than PLA, DFT, and PAA, respectively. This is due to the fact that the
representation errors of MFDR are guaranteed to be lower than PLA and DFT with Algorithm
2. Also, MFDR can achieve lower representation error (i.e. < 20%) with relatively low NoCs.
With 6 coeﬃcients, the average representation error of MFDR representations is 0.1974 with a
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Figure 5.9: (a) The representation error of PLA, DFT, PAA, MFDR, given diﬀerent NoCs
(N = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10). (b) The average execution time of generating DR representations.
variance of 0.0123 .
Fig.5.10(a)-(d) illustrate the experimental results from the four representative data sets. While
the performance of PLA and DFT vary as per scenarios (i.e. while PLA generally yields lower
representation errors in the CC data set, DFT is superior in ECG.), the performance of MFDR
is relatively independent of the scenarios. It consistently yields the lowest representation error
with very smaller variance.
Fig.5.9(b) illustrates the computational time for each DR technique to generate DR represen-
tations from the time series. Although MFDR requires higher computational time than other
traditional solutions as we stated in Theorem 5.1 in Chapter 5.3, the computational time of
MFDR is of a similar order to DFT. The computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is also
depicted in Fig.5.11. As can be observed, the computational time increases with higher NoCs.
However, the increased time is proportional to NoCs; therefore, since MFDR representations can
achieve small representation errors with low NoCs, the computational overhead of Algorithm 2
is acceptable.
5.5.2 Closeness to Original Distance
In this subsection, we evaluate the ability of MFDR to recover the distance between original
time series. In real world applications, distances are very eﬀective measures to evaluate the
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Figure 5.10: The representation error of PLA, DFT, PAA, MFDR, given diﬀerent NoCs (N =
2, 4, 6, 8, 10).
similarity of two time series [Fu11]. Therefore, it is preferable to use a DR technique that can
accurately recover the original distance from its DR representations. To evaluate this accuracy,
we propose a measure called closeness to original distance. Given two time series s and sˆ, we
formally define closeness to original distance as:
|Dist(s, sˆ)−DistDR(s, sˆ)|
Dist(s, sˆ)
As can be easily observed in above equation, the lower the closeness to original distance, the
higher the accuracy. The experimental results are illustrated in Fig.5.12, where the error
bars depict the variances of such results. Although MFDR cannot guarantee to yield the
lowest closeness to original distance, we have observed that MFDR outperforms the other three
traditional techniques in 42 (of 44) data sets. As illustrated in Fig.5.12(a), the closeness to
original distance of MFDR is 0.0899, 0.0139, and 0.2467 lower than PLA, DFT, and PAA,
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Figure 5.11: The execution time of calculating NTR and NSE given diﬀerent NoCs (N =
2, 4, 6, 8, 10).
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Figure 5.12: (a) The closeness to original distance with PLA, DFT, PAA, and MFDR, given
diﬀerent NoCs (N = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10). (b) The average execution time of computing distances
between time series from DR representations.
respectively. Also, MFDR can achieve similar lower closeness to original distance to other
techniques with smaller NoCs.
Fig.5.13(a)-(d) illustrate the experimental results from the four representative data sets. Similar
to the results we observed in the representation error experiment, MFDR outperforms other
techniques in all four examples, while the performance of PLA and DFT vary as per scenarios.
This is due to the smaller representation error of MFDR as we have observed in the experimental
results in Chapter 5.5.1. Fig.5.12(b) illustrates the average time required to calculate the
distance between two DR representations. As one may be aware, this computational time
should be proportional to NoCs.
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Figure 5.13: The closeness to original distance with PLA, DFT, PAA, and MFDR, given
diﬀerent NoCs (N = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10).
However, we have observed that spectrum-based DFT and MFDR have higher computational
time than the polynomial techniques (i.e. PAA and PLA). Also, the computational time of
DFT, PAA and PLA are independent of the NoCs. This is due to the fact that the computation
is predominated by the data structure operations rather than the calculation of distance from
DR representations. Since the computation of MFDR distance (defined in Theorem 5.4) is
more sophisticated than other techniques, this proportional correlation can be observed with
higher NoCs (i.e. N > 6).
Although MFDR requires higher computational time than other traditional solutions as we
stated in Theorem 5.1 in Chapter 5.3, the computational time of MFDR is of a similar order
to DFT. The computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is also depicted in Fig.5.11. As can be
observed, the computational time increases with higher NoCs. However, the increased time is
linear to NoCs; therefore, since MFDR can achieve low representation errors with few NoCs,
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the computational overhead of Algorithm 2 is acceptable.
5.5.3 MFDR vs MFDR-N
In this subsection, we study the performance of MFDR-N and the impact of two parameters,
i.e. z and τnoise used in the white-noise examination algorithm (i.e. Algorithm 5) proposed
in Chapter 5.4.3. Although it is impossible to compute the representation error caused by
MFDR-N because noise is a random variable, MFDR-N can infer the expected value of distance
by exploiting the energy density of the noise. Therefore we use the closeness to original distance
to evaluate the performance of MFDR-N.
Since the two parameters z and τnoise may both have an impact on the distance measure, we
define τnoise = 0.5, which guarantees that the majority of IMFs in MFDR-N is truly noise.
Three z (i.e. z = 1, 2, 3) that ensure 68.268%, 95.449%, and 99.730% of noise can be identified
by the proposed statistic significance test, respectively. The experiment results are illustrated
in Fig.5.14 and 5.15. It is worth noting that, to improve readability, the error bars of MFDR
[z=2] and MFDR [z=3] are not shown in Fig.5.14(a) and 5.15(c) as they are beyond the scope
of the y axis (0.729 ∼ 3.849 in Fig.5.14(a) and 2.535 ∼ 6.029 in Fig.5.15(c)).
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Figure 5.14: (a)The closeness to original distance with MFDR and MFDR-N given diﬀerent
threshold settings (z = 1, 2, 3). (b) The execution time of computing NTR,NSE and τNO given
diﬀerent NoCs (N = 2, 4, 6) and threshold settings (z = 1, 2, 3).
As can be observed in Fig.5.14(a) and Fig.5.15(a)-(d), the performance of MFDR-N varies as
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per scenario. In Fig.5.15(a) and (d), no significant performance improvement of MFDR-N was
observed as no noise can be extracted from non-noisy time series data (of which the examples
are depicted in Fig.5.8(a) and (d)). Also, MFDR-N may sometimes fail to preserve accurate
distance measures with looser boundaries(i.e. z = 2, 3), when the existence of noise is ambiguous
as the example illustrated in 5.15(c). However, we observed that MFDR-N outperforms MFDR
for noisy scenarios as in the example illustrated in Fig.5.15(b), where the closeness to original
distance of z = 1, 2, 3 are 0.0952, 0.1433, and 0.1302 smaller than MFDR.
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Figure 5.15: The closeness to original distance with MFDR and MFDR-N given diﬀerent thresh-
old settings (z = 1, 2, 3).
According to our statistics, in general, z = 1 outperforms other two parameter settings (i.e.
z = 2, 3). It introduces no (or little) extra errors when a given data set contains no or ambiguous
noise signals. Furthermore, in noisy scenarios, although z = 1 provides less improvement when
N ≤ 4, it achieves similar performance when N > 4, compared to other two settings (z = 2, 3).
Fig.5.14 (b) depicts the average execution time including both NoC training (i.e. Algorithm
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2),and the statistical significance test (i.e. Algorithm 5) in Chapter 5.4.3. According to our
statistics, the average and median execution times of the statistical significance test is 3.25
and 3.014 times slower than computing MFDR representations (i.e. Algorithm 5.3). Therefore,
when applying MFDR-N with higher NoCs (e.g. N ≥ 6), finding optimal NoC will start
dominating the computation.
We also observe that the correlation between the execution time of statistical significance
tests and MFDR representation computations vary as per scenarios. In the best and worst
case examples, the execution time of statistical significance tests are 1.127 and 10.088 times
slower than MFDR representation computations. This is because, given a time series, the
computational complexity of EMD essentially depends on the number of IMFs contained in
such time series, which has little correlation to time series length and NoCs.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a multi-feature dimensionality reduction (MFDR) technique, which
can simultaneously preserve two main types of features (i.e. local trends and seasonal compo-
nents) in the time series. It guarantees the smallest representation errors, and in average can
reduce those of other traditional DR techniques by 0.1479. The closeness of original distance
of MFDR is also 0.1168 more accurate than other techniques in average, while retaining the
same order of magnitude of computational overhead. Furthermore, through exploitation of
noise characteristics, we propose MFDR-N, a modified version of MFDR. Our experimental re-
sults on noisy time series data demonstrates that MFDR-N can further reduce the closeness of
original distance by up to 0.1433. The computational overhead between MFDR-N and MFDR
can also be narrowed by increasing the number of coeﬃcients (NoCs).
Chapter 6
DMGA: Distributed MWM-Based
Grouping Algorithm
As we discussed in Chapter 4.1, in order to exploit the spatiotemporal correlation in our anomaly
classifier, it is ideal to divide sensors in a NDSS into small correlation groups in a fully dis-
tributed way. This not only ensures that strong spatiotemporal correlations exist among all
sensors in each correlation group, but minimise the overhead caused by anomaly classifiers,
such as our GAD algorithm of which will be presented in Chapter 7. To this end we develop a
distributed matching-based grouping algorithm (DMGA), the first correlation aware grouping
algorithm for anomaly detection.
6.1 Introduction and Related Work
Grouping and clustering is an important research topic in sensing networks as it has many
applications [TS08, BK10, LA10]. However, none of this research has proposed a solution
which can optimize the correlation of each group while minimizing the computation and stor-
age overheads introduced by correlation-based anomaly detections (such as our GAD) while
providing performance guarantees. Also, although some grouping algorithms were proposed
in various research areas such as wireless networks[CLL04, Bas99, YF04, AY07] and complex
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networks[PDFV05, NG04], none of those focus on constructing correlation groups in a fully
distributed manner as in DMGA [Bas99, YF04, HYCC07].
6.2 Pairwise Correlation Strength and Similarity
Measures
In order to optimise the detection accuracy, DMGA is required to guarantee the existence
spatial correlations between sensors in each correlation group. Therefore, with the aim of
optimising these spatial correlations, we need to define a measure for our grouping mechanism
to optimize, that is, correlation strengths (CSs). In NDSSs, CSs are measures that reveal the
degree of similarity between the behaviours of two sensors. The CS ci,j between sensor i and
j are usually bounded as 0 ≤ ci,j ≤ 1. High CSs indicate that the sensors are highly spatially
correlated; therefore, these sensors are more likely to react similarly to the changes in physical
phenomena and surrounding environments.
To describe such CSs, one the most widely used techniques is Pearson correlation coeﬃcient.
This coeﬃcient is a parametric measure that can reveal the linear dependency between two
sets of data. Some other statistical correlation coeﬃcients, such as nonparametric Spearman’s
rank correlation coeﬃcient, are also candidate CS measures as they can better illustrates the
non-linear relationship between sensor measurements, which potentially exist in heterogeneous
NDSSs.
Apart from statistical correlations, similarity measures, such as Euclidean distance [FRM94],
Mahalanobis distance, dynamic time wrapping (DTW) [BC94], longest common subsequence
(LCSS) [VKG02], edit distance with real penalty (ERP)[CN04b], edit distance on real subse-
quence (EDR) [CO¨O05], and spatial assembling distance (SpADe) [CNO+07], can also be em-
ployed to provides better. Diﬀerent from the aforementioned correlation coeﬃcient techniques,
where correlation coeﬃcients are directly computed from raw measurements, when using these
distance measurements to compute CSs, sensor measurements are required to be normalised to
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ensure that CSs are bounded in between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 ≤ ci,j ≤ 1 ).
For simplicity, in this thesis, we exploit Pearson correlation coeﬃcient and Euclidean distance
as the similarity measures in DMGA when applied with raw-measurement-based GAD and
feature-based FGAD (the details of which will be proposed in Chapter 7.2 and 7.3), respectively.
6.3 Grouping for Overhead Minimization
For a given NDSS S, let G ⊆ S represents a correlation group, and G represents the set of
correlation groups, i.e. a grouping solution. We define Π ⊂ 2S as the set of all possible grouping
solutions. DMGA aims to find a grouping solution G ∈ Π, which maximizes the spatiotemporal
correlations in all groups and guarantees strong spatiotemporal correlations among all sensors
in each correlation group, while minimizing the computational complexity of GAD. Formally,
DMGA aims at solving the following problem:
max
G∈Π
∑
{i,j}⊂G,G∈G
ci,j (6.1)
subject to
|G| ≥ Nmin, ∀G ∈ G (6.2)
ci,j ≥ cmin, ∀i, j ∈ G ∈ G (6.3)∑
G∈G
|G|2 ≤
∑
G∈G′
|G|2, ∀G′ ̸= G (6.4)
where 0 ≤ ci,j ≤ 1 is the correlation strength, which represents the spatiotemporal correlation
between sensor i and j; cmin is a predefined minimal correlation threshold; and Nmin presents
the minimal correlation group size to guarantee anomaly-detection accuracy [Jia09, KI04]. The
objective (6.1) is to maximize total correlations between sensors in all groups. Constraint (6.2)
states that each group should consist of at least Nmin sensors. Constraint (6.3) ensures the
strong correlations between each pair of sensors in each group. Constraint (6.4) ensures the
grouping solution should also minimize the computational overhead of GAD algorithm, which
is O(
∑
G∈G |G|2/|S|) per sensor.
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6.4 12 Approximation of Maximum Weight Matching
DMGA solves problem (6.1)-(6.4) by utilizing distributed MaximumWeighted Matching (MWM)
[Hoe04, YSML14]. In graph theory, a matching is a set of links that do not share a common
node. A MWM is a matching with maximal aggregate weights (i.e. the maximal aggregated
correlations in our context) over all other matchings for a given weight graph. However, finding
an optimal MWM is a NP-hard problem. Therefore, instead of trying to achieve an optimal
solution, we exploit 12 approximation of MWM. Figure 6.1 depicts an example illustrating the
diﬀerence between standard MWM and the 12 approximation of MWM. This approximation
solution is a greedy algorithm, of which at each iteration, it greedily matches two unmatched
nodes that share the highest-weighted edge in the graph. According to [Hoe04, YSML14], this
approximation solution yields a sub-optimal result which can achieve at least 12 weight of the
optimal result. Furthermore, it is light weight to compute (i.e. O(|S|) computational complex-
ity) even in a centralised form and can easily be extended to a distributed version, which is
exploited in DMGA.
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6.5 DMGA: Grouping based on Distributed Maximum
Weight Matching
The pseudocode of DMGA is summarized in Algorithm 6. The idea of DMGA is based on the
concept of hyper correlation graphs Gnc (Gn,Ln,Wn) at the nth iteration of the while loop (lines
6-10), where Gn represents the set of hyper-nodes (i.e. non-overlapping correlation groups of
the same size 2n), Ln is the set of hyper-links between each pair of hyper nodes; and the weight
of each hyper-link (G1,G2) ∈ Ln is computed as the sum of Pearson correlation coeﬃcients
between each pair of sensors in G1∪G2. At the nth iteration, the while loop first computes the
MWM (discuss later) for the hyper-correlation graph Gn-1c (Gn-1,Ln-1,Wn-1) generated in the last
iteration. Based on the computed MWM the nth hyper correlation graph Gnc (Gn,Ln,Wn) is
then constructed. According to Theorem 1, the while loop operates at most ⌈log2Nmin⌉ times,
where ⌈log2Nmin⌉ represents the minimal integer that is larger than log2Nmin. Eventually, if
each sensor in S has been put into a correlation group in Gn, the algorithm terminates after the
while loop; otherwise, the algorithm inserts each sensor individually to an established group
in Gn (lines 11–15), according to Theorem 1.
Fig. 6.2 illustrates an example to show the operation of DMGA. Assume Nmin = 4 in this
example. Initially, we have the initial hyper-correlation graph G0c consisting of 10 sensors
(Step 0). In the first iteration of the while loop (Steps 1 and 2 in Fig. 6.2), the MWM is
computed (Step 1) and the first hyper-correlation graph G1c is constructed (Step 2), where
G1 = {{a, c}, {g, h}, {e, d}, {i, j}, {f, b}}. Similarly, the second round of the while loop
(steps 3 and 4 in Fig. 6.2) computes the MWM for G1c (Step 3) and constructs G
2
c (Step 4),
where G2 = {{g, h, i, j}, {e, d, f, b}}. Finally, in Step 5, the individual sensors a and c are
inserted into the established two groups respectively, and then the algorithm terminates.
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Algorithm 6: The pseudo code of DMGA.
Input : S: the set of all sensors in a industrial sensing system.,
ci,j: Correlation between every pair of sensors i, j ∈ S,
cmin: Predefined minimal correlation threshold,
Nmin: the minimal number of nodes in a correlation group,
N 1-hopi : the set of one-hop communication neighbors of i.
Output: Gn: the set of hyper-nodes in the nth iteration.
// Initialise variables
1 n← 0
2 G0 ← {{i} : i ∈ S}
3 L0 ← {({i}, {j}) : i ∈ S, j ∈ N 1-hopi , ci,j ≥ cmin}
4 W0 ← {ci,j : ({i}, {j}) ∈ L0}
5 G0c ← CON(G0,L0,W0)
// Establish non-overlapping groups with same sizes
6 while 2n < Nmin do
7 n← n+ 1
8 Gn ←MWM(Gn−1c )
9 Ln ← {(G1,G2) : ∀i ∈ G1 ∈ Gn, j ∈ G2 ∈ Gn
10 s.t.({i}, {j}) ∈ L0}
11 Wn ← {WG1,G2 =
∑
i,j∈G1∪G2 ci,j : (G1,G2) ∈ Ln}
12 Gnc = CON(Gn,Ln,Wn)
// Insert individual sensors in established groups
13 for each sensor (i ∈ S) ∧ (i /∈ G, ∀G ∈ Gn) do
14 for each group G ∈ Gn, |G| = 2n do
15 if ∀G ′ ∈ Gns.t.|G ′| = 2n ∧∑j∈G ci,j ≥∑j∈G′ ci,j then
16 G ← G ∪ {i}
17 return Gn
Figure 6.2: An example to illustrate DMGA.
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6.6 Distributed Operations of DMGA
DMGA is based on locally greedy optimal-link selections. Three one-hop control messages are
used in this DMGA: Matching Apply (MA), Matching Reply (MR) and drop. To initialize
the first hyper-correlation graph G0c(G0,L0,W0) (Lines 1-4 in Algorithm 6), every sensor i ∈ S
broadcasts all of its readings during the initialization phase [0, tinit) to all its 1-hop neighbors
j ∈ N 1-hopi . Based on these sensor readings, the first hyper correlation graph G0c(G0,L0,W0)
can be established in a fully distributed manner.
Now we discuss the distributed operations of matching. For the nth hyper-correlation graph
Gnc (Gn,Ln,Wn), DMGA compute MWM as follows. Every hyper node Gnk selects its locally
heaviest-weighted and free (LHWF) link (Gnk ,Gnl∗), where
(Gnk ,Gnl∗) = arg max
(Gnk ,Gnl )∈Ln
∑
i,j∈Gnk∪Gnl
ci,j (6.5)
Then Gnk sends a MA message to Gnl∗ to request the matching of link (Gnk ,Gnl∗). If this link is
also the LHWF link for Gnl∗ , then Gnl∗ sends a MR message back to Gnk to confirm this link is
matched, and multicasts a drop message to its other neighbor groups, otherwise, Gl ignores
the message. Alternatively, (Gnk ,Gnl∗) is eventually dropped. If link (Gnk ,Gnl∗) is dropped, then
Gnk selects a new LHWF link and sends another MA message. The above process repeats until
every hyper node has either a matched link, or all its links are dropped and marked as free.
Finally, each sensor within free hyper node(s) joins a established correlation group with size
Nmin.
6.7 Performance Analysis
In this section, we are going to discuss the performance of DMGA with our GAD algorithm, of
which the details will be proposed in Chapter 7. Since GAD is a centralised anomaly classifier
that requires measurements from nearby correlated sensors, we exploit it as a showcase to illus-
86 Chapter 6. DMGA: Distributed MWM-Based Grouping Algorithm
trate how DMGA minimises the computational overhead of such type of classifiers and allows
them to scale to diﬀerent sizes of NDSSs. Theorem 6.1 below demonstrates three theoretical
performance guarantees achieved by DMGA.
Theorem 6.1. DMGA achieves the following performance guarantees:
1. DMGA minimizes the computational overhead of GAD algorithm, i.e. Constraint (6.4)
is guaranteed.
2. The worst-case communication overhead of DMGA is O(1) per sensor, with respect to the
sensing system size |S|.
3. DMGA achieves at least 1/Nmin performance of the optimal solution of problem (6.1)-
(6.4).
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 6.1
We can write the overhead of the GAD algorithm for a correlation group G as α|G|2,α > 0. To
minimize computation overhead of GAD, we have following problem
min
G∈Π
α
∑
G∈G
|G|2 (6.6)
subject to∑
G∈G
|G| = |S|, |G| ≥ Nmin, ∀G ∈ G (6.7)
Due to its convexity of the objective (6.6), it is clear to see that the objective (6.6) is minimized
when every group size is identical and minimized (i.e. Nmin). DMGA achieves this according
to lines 1–10 of shown Algorithm 6. Let N rest = |S| mod Nmin and N g = ⌊|S|/Nmin⌋. Now
the N rest sensors can be divided into K ≤ N rest subgroups. Denote Ik as the size of the kth
subgroup, i.e.
∑
1≤k≤K Ik = N
rest, where each subgroup are inserted into a established group
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with size Nmin. We have the overall overhead of the GAD algorithm:
α((N g −K)(Nmin)2 +
K∑
k=1
(Nmin + Ik)
2) (6.8)
Obviously, (6.8) is minimized when Ik = 1, ∀k ≤ K, which is achieved by DMGA (Lines 11–14
shown in Algorithm 6) ✷
Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 6.1
According to the distributed operations of DMGA, at most two messages are transmitted over
a hyper-link in each hyper-correlation graph (i.e. a MA and a MR messages, or a MA and a
drop messages). For any correlation graph Gc(Gn,Ln,Wn), 0 ≤ n ≤ ⌈log2Nmin⌉, we have the
number of groups |Gn| ≤ |S|/2n and the number of hyper links |Ln| = D|Gn|/2 ≤ D|S|/2n+1,
where D is the degree of Gc(G1,L1,W1). Therefore, the per sensor messages produced by
DMGA algorithm for all hyper correlation graphs is at most
2
log2Nmin∑
n=0
|Ln|/|S| ≤
∞∑
n=0
D|S|
2n
/|S| = 2D
which is independent of |S|. ✷
Proof of Part 3 of Theorem 6.1
Distributed matching at each hyper correlation graph can achieve at least 1/2 of the total
weights of the optimal [Hoe04]. Since DMGA compute the distributed matching for (log2⌈Nmin⌉
hyper correlation graphs, at can achieve at least 1/Nmin of the optimal. ✷
Theoretically, problem (6.1)-(6.4) may not have a feasible solution for some large Nmin and
cmin. From graph theoretical point of view, the setting of cmin defines the topology of the
initial hyper-correlation graph G0c(G0,L0,W0). To ensure (6.1)-(6.4) has a feasible solution,
G0c(G0,L0,W0) must have at least |S|/Nmin non-overlapping cliques (i.e. complete subgraph)
of size Nmin [PDFV05].
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In practice, when the certain settings of Nmin and cmin derives no feasible solution, the most
straightforward solution is to reduce these two thresholds. However, to fulfill the redundancy
and reliability requirements of GAD, it is necessary to have a reasonably high cmin, which guar-
antees the lowest bond of sensor-correlation requirement during DMGA grouping. Therefore,
if there is no feasible solution, users should try to reduce Nmin rather than cmin. It is worth
noting that GAD only require each correlation group consists of more than 3 sensors to achieve
its high detection accuracy.
6.8 Experiment and Evaluation
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, DMGA is a correlation-based grouping algorithm
that optimises the detection accuracy of our anomaly classifier (i.e. GAD) while minimising
both computation and storage overheads introduced such anomaly classifier. To have a notion
of the performance improvements that DMGA can provide GAD, we first calculate the compu-
tational overhead of GAD with and without DMGA. The results shown in Fig. 6.3 demonstrate
that our DMGA can significantly reduce the overhead of GAD for large scale sensor networks.
This verifies our analytical results that GAD with DMGA can achieve O(1) per-sensor overhead
with respect to the network size.
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Figure 6.3: Per-sensor computational overhead introduced by GAD.
Wishing to understand how DMGA can improve the overall detection accuracy of our GAD
anomaly classifier, two simulations were performed with one simulation scenario and one real-
world trace data from London V&A Museum museum. Two other grouping algorithms are
6.8. Experiment and Evaluation 89
exploited as baseline comparison; including a naive grouping algorithm, where sensors are
grouped based on their sensor IDs only; and a non-grouping scheme, where all sensors are
grouped into single cluster.
In these simulations, two metrics were exploited to measure the detection accuracy of GAD,
including successful detection rate (SDR) and false-positive detection rate (FPDR), which are
defined as follows:
SDR =
number of successful detections
number of anomalous measurements
×%
FPDR =
number of false detections
number of normal measurements
×%
Due to the lack of ground-truth-anomalous measurements, anomalies were simulated with two
abnormal sensor behaviours: CONSTANT fault and NOISE fault defined in [UBH09, SGG10].
To create discernable impacts on sensor measurements, we simulated CONSTANT and NOISE
faults by increasing sensor readings by 20% and the background noises by 600%, respectively.
Note that since SHORT faults [UBH09, SGG10] show similar short-term behaviours (i.e. a
sudden transients in sensor readings) to the other two types of faults, and they are relatively
easier to detect [SGG10], we did not include this type of faults in our simulation.
6.8.1 Simulation: Environmental Monitoring
In this simulation, 200 sensors and 25 Rational-Quadratic phenomenon sources [VAA04, VA06]
were randomly deployed and located, respectively, over a 50m×50m square area. The covariance
function between sensor i its surrounding physical phenomena at time t is defined as
ri(t) =
∑
s=1,2,··· ,25
Es(t)
(di,s + 1)2
where ri(t) denotes the measurement of sensor i at time t, Es(t) denotes the value of s phe-
nomenon, and di,s denotes the distance between sensor i and phenomenon s. The radio com-
munication range was defined as 30m, which generally supported by standard IEEE 802.15.4
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protocol. In addition, two non-standard grouping algorithms were performed , including the
a naive grouping algorithm (with which sensors are randomly grouped) and the GAD without
grouping (where 200 sensors were regarded as a single group). Both DMGA and naive grouping
clustered the 200 sensors into 25 diﬀerent groups consisting of 8 sensors.
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Figure 6.4: Detection accuracy of GAD in a large-scale deployment.
Fig. 6.4 illustrates the simulation results. As can be easily observed, GAD with DMGA
can achieve more than 99% SDR while remain around 0.1% FPDR even when the anomaly-
occurrence rate at 5%. In contrast, the naive-grouping solution and non-grouping solution can
only detect about 72% and 85% of anomalous measurements when the anomaly-occurrence rates
are lower than 1%. Also, without DMGA, the detection accuracy of GAD significantly drops
at higher anomaly occurrence rates (i.e. more than 1%). According to our analysis, the naive
grouping algorithm reduces the performance of GAD as it cannot guarantee the spatiotemporal
correlations in each correlation groups. Since these natural existing spatiotemporal correlations
are the basis of our GAD framework, lack of correlations can result in unexpected false-positive
detections (i.e. non-anomalous measurements are regarded as anomalous), and therefore GAD
loses its opportunities to identify real anomalies that occur when GAD is re-establishing its
estimation model. Similarly, without grouping, GAD also cannot achieve its optimal accuracy
as the spatial correlations do not strongly exist between all the sensors in the entire network.
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Figure 6.5: Floor plan and sensor deployment in the ground floor of the building.
6.8.2 Case Study: Structural Monitoring in London V&A Museum
As one of the most important industrial sensing applications, structural monitoring aims to
guarantee the healthy conditions of buildings, by deploying ambient sensors at the specific as-
signed positions[TSB+13, CCXS10]. Due to the massive deployments, these sensors are usually
low-cost low-end components and typically do not provide reliability guarantee. Therefore,
anomaly detection is required to ensure the reliability of overall sensing systems.
We constructed simulations based on a real data set obtained from a building (the floor plan
of which is illustrated in Fig. 6.5). This data set contains of temperature and humidity data
from 72 sensors (with same sensing rate of one reading per every 15 seconds) during one year
(from 20/Oct/2008 to 19/Oct/2009). In addition, to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of DMGA,
two non-standard GAD was performed on the same data set, including the GAD that adopted
a naive grouping algorithm (with which sensors are randomly grouped) and the GAD without
grouping (where 72 sensors were regarded as a single group). Both DMGA and naive grouping
clustered the 72 sensors into 9 diﬀerent groups consisting of 8 sensors.
As shown Fig 6.6(a) and (b), by using DMGA, GAD can identify more than 95% anomalies
with only around 0.4% false-positives, which are much better than no-grouping (75%–85% SDR
and 4%– 4.6% FPDR) and naive grouping (61% – 81% SDR and 4% –4.6% FPDR). This is
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Figure 6.6: The performance of GAD with diﬀerent grouping criteria in the build structure
monitoring application.
because naive grouping cannot provide spatiotemporal correlation guarantees, and strongly
spatial correlations do not exist between all the sensors in the entire building. The lack of
correlations resulted in many unexpected false-positive detections as spotted in the previous
simulation.
6.9 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a novel correlation-based grouping algorithm which can group sen-
sor nodes in a NDSS into several correlation groups, where strong spatiotemporal correlations
exist among all sensors, with O(1) computational complexity with respect to the size of NDSS.
Compared to traditional clustering techniques, it guarantees that the correlation between sen-
sors in a single cluster is larger than a certain threshold and the overall correlation strength
is sub-optimal. Our experiments results also show that DMGA can significantly improve the
detection accuracy of our anomaly classifier, GAD, while minimising the complexity of our
anomaly classifier to O(1) with respect to the NDSS size.
Chapter 7
GAD: General Anomaly Detection
7.1 Introduction
As to what have reviewed in Chapter 3.2, the state-of-the-art anomaly classifiers are either
simple but limited by rigid assumptions, or powerful but complex and therefore not being
suited to resource-scares and large-scale NDSSs. We have yet seen a general solution being
proposed to cope with all general NDSS scenarios. To overcome this problem, in Chapter 5, we
have proposed two feature extraction methods, MFDR and MFDR-N, which are able to obtain
the essence of sensor measurements with only few number of coeﬃcients; also, in Chapter 6,
we propose a correlation-aware sensor clustering algorithm, DMGA, which not only decompose
an anomaly detection problem into several sub-problems that can be solve distributed but
guarantees strong spatiotemporal correlation among all sensors in each correlation group. The
only missing puzzle in our solution so far is the anomaly classifier, which is performed within
each correlation group G to identify anomaly conditions of sensor measurements.
To complete the puzzle, in this chapter, we propose general anomaly detection (GAD) algo-
rithm, the final component of our solution. This classifier exploits the spatiotemporal corre-
lation, which is widely exist in the natural environments as we discussed in Chapter 2.2, to
realise its anomaly classification function. It can identify the anomalies which result in rapid
changes in measurement patterns, such as deviations and noises, by tagging each sensor mea-
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surements with its anomaly condition. However, we have been aware that GAD cannot detect
those gradual changes that are only observed in long-term patterns as we discussed in Chapter
2.3.2. To overcome this problem, we utilise our MFDR and MFDR-N (proposed in Chapter 5)
and propose feature-based GAD (FGAD). With FGAD, we are able to exploit other similarity
measures such as Euclidean distance to capture those long-term pattern deviations.
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Figure 7.1: An high-level illustration of GAD.
The following of this chapter is organised as follows. GAD and FGAD algorithm are proposed
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in Chapter 7.2 and 7.3, respectively. Experimental evaluations are given in Chapter 7.5. In
Chapter 7.6, we use a real-world example to demonstrate how our GAD and FGAD can be
exploited to against malicious data injection attacks in smart grids, and finally conclude this
chapter in Chapter 7.7.
7.2 GAD Algorithm
The outline of our GAD algorithm (i.e. Algorithm 7) is illustrated in Fig. 7.1. As can be seen,
GAD can be mainly divided into the following three phases: pairwise correlation-consistency
assessment, trust-based voting, and event/anomaly classification. In the first phase, GAD
estimates the model of normal pairwise correlation between sensors in each correlation group.
If the pairwise correlations between newly arrived measurements violate these models, these
correlations are regarded unreliable, otherwise reliable. In the trust-based voting phase, a
two-round voting is performed to identify anomalous measurements. In this voting, if the
measurements of a sensor are regarded unreliable by the majority of it neighbour, this sensor or
its measurements will be marked unreliable and therefore regarded as an indication of anomaly
occurrence. After anomalies are identified, a preliminary anomaly diagnosis mechanism is
performed to distinguish genuine environmental events from node anomalies (which are typically
caused by node failures). The detail of each phases is introduced below.
7.2.1 Pairwise Correlation Consistency Assessment
The main objective of pairwise correlation consistency assessment is to find out whether nearby
sensors nodes (whose measurements should be spatiotemporally correlated) trust that the mea-
surements of each others are reliable. Fig. 7.2 illustrates an example of this pairwise assessment.
Given a correlation group, to generate the trust worthy information, the pairwise correlation
model of norms between each pair of sensors is computed. If the current pairwise correlation
model between two sensors is consistent to its estimated model of norms, we say these two
sensors trust each other. For example, in Fig. 7.2, sensor 1 and 2 trust each other as their
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Algorithm 7: The pseudo code of GAD.
Input : G: the set of sensors within the same correlation group,
△t: predefined sampling window,
ϕ: predefined parameter that controls the probability margin,
Output: ⟨rci(t)⟩i∈G: the anomaly condition of reading ri(t),
e(t): the event condition of this correlation group.
// PHASE 1: Pairwise correlation consistency Assessment.
1 for each sensor i ∈ G do
2 for each sensor (j ∈ G) ∧ (j ̸= i) do
3 R˜i,j(t)← PCRi,j(t,△t,ϕ)
4 if (ri(t), rj(t) ∈ R˜i,j(t)) then
5 Ci,j(t)← 1
6 else
7 Ci,j(t)← 0
// PHASE 2: Trust-based voting.
8 for each sensor i ∈ G do // first-round voting.
9 N consi (t)← {j : Ci,j(t) = 1, j ∈ (G − i)}
10 if |N consi (t)|/|N | ≥ 0.5 then
11 tci(t)← TRUSTWORTHY
12 else
13 tci(t)← UNTRUSTWORTHY
14 for each sensor i ∈ G do // second-round voting.
15 N trusti (t)← {j : tcj(t) = TRUSTWORTHY, j ∈ (G − i)}
16 if |N trusti (t)|/|N | ≥ 0.5 then
17 if |N consi (t)|N trusti (t)|/||N trusti (t)| ≥ 0.5 then
18 rci(t)← GOOD
19 else
20 rci(t)← ABNORMAL
21 else
22 rci(t)← UNKNOWN
// PHASE 3: Event and anomaly classification.
23 Gun(t)← {i : rci(t) = UNKNOWN, i ∈ (G)}
24 if |Gun(t)|/|G| ≥ 0.5 then
25 e(t)← TRUE
26 else
27 e(t)← FALSE
28 return ⟨rci(t)⟩i∈G and e(t)
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current correlation model is consistent to their previous, while sensor 1 an 3 regarded each
other untrustworthy.
untrustworthy
trustworthy
trustworthy
2 3
Consistent
Inconsistent
1
current model estimated model of norms
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
Inconsistent
1 2 2 3 1 3
Correlation Group
Figure 7.2: An illustration pairwise correlation consistency assessment.
To compute the model of norms, consider each pair of sensors i and j in a group G. As we
discussed in Chapter 2.2, their current readings ri(t) and rj(t) should be temporally correlated
to their previous readings before t. Therefore, the estimated consistency region of i and j,
R˜i,j(t), can be computed, based on their previous sensor readings before time t,. Here, R˜i,j(t)
represents the set of all possible potentially consistent reading pairs of ri(t) and rj(t) at current
time t. If current sensor reading pair (ri(t), rj(t)) ∈ R˜i,j(t), we say this reading pair is consistent;
otherwise, inconsistent. Let Ci,j(t) denote this correlation consistency,
Ci,j(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1, if (ri(t), rj(t)) ∈ R˜i,j(t)
0, otherwise
(7.1)
To compute R˜i,j(t), here we propose a function, PCRi,j(t,△t,ϕ), where△t denotes the sampling
window size, and ϕ denotes the number of standard deviations. Geometrically, R˜i,j(t) is a
rotated ellipse area on the Cartesian coordinate formed with rj and rj, as shown in Fig. 7.3
(a). Here, the estimated center of the ellipse (r˜i(t), r˜j(t)) is computed by using Exponential
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Weighted Moving Average (EWMA):
r˜i(t) = 0.5ri(t− 1) + 0.5r˜i(t− 1) (7.2)
Figure 7.3: Illustration of correlation consistency assessment in GAD.
The major and minor radius of the ellipse R˜i,j(t) are computed by using the singular value
decomposition (SVD) [JFH13], which is a mathematical procedure to convert observations of
multiple observers into orthogonal variables called principle components (PCs). These PCs
indicate the most representative variances in these observations. Consider the first step of
SVD, Eigen decomposition on a data covariance matrix:
COVi,j =
⎡⎢⎣ covi,i(t) covi,j(t)
covj,i(t) covj,j(t)
⎤⎥⎦ (7.3)
where each entry covi,j(t) is defined as
covi,j = EGOODt,△t [(ri(t)− EGOODt,△t [ri(t)])(rj(t)− EGOODt,△t [rj(t)])]
where the operator EGOODt,△t [·] returns the arithmetic average of previous reliable sensor readings
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during the sampling window [t −△t, t − 1]. The identification of reliable (i.e. GOOD) sensor
readings will be discussed in detail in next subsection. With COVi,j(t), we have
COVi,j(t)PCi,j(t) = λi,j(t)PCi,j(t) (7.4)
where the eigenvectors PCi,j(t) contains two orthogonal principle components (vectors) pcai,j(t)
and pcbi,j(t); and the matrix of eigenvalues λi,j(t) consists of two variances (σ
a
i,j(t)
2) and
(σbi,j(t))
2, where σai,j(t) and σ
b
i,j(t) are standard deviations related to the two principle com-
ponents above.
With PCi,j(t) and λi,j(t), the consistency region ellipse R˜i,j(t) can be computed, as shown
in Fig. 7.3 (b). Here, ϕ is a parameter that controls the probability margin of R˜i,j(t). For
instance, ϕ = 3 can assure that 99.46% of normal observations lie in R˜i,j(t).
7.2.2 Trust-Based Voting
In this phase, GAD exploits a trust-based voting algorithm to identify anomaly condition of
the reading ri(t) of each sensor i in every correlation group G at time t. Here, the correlation
consistencies Ci,j(t) defined in (7.5), are considered as a measure of trust between each pair
of sensors i, j ∈ G. Before introducing the voting, we first define the consistent neighbour set
N consi (t) for each sensor i ∈ G at time t as:
N consi (t) = {j : Ci,j(t) = 1, j ∈ Ni}
where Ni = G − {i} is the set of sensor i’s all neighbors. This stage consists of two rounds of
voting:
First Round Voting
In this voting, certain sensors are voted as trustworthy references. Sensor i is regarded as
trustworthy, if the majority of i’s neighbors are consistent neighbors (i.e. |N consi (t)|/|Ni| ≥ 50%
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); otherwise, it is regarded as untrustworthy.
Second Round Voting
After the first round voting, only trustworthy sensors are qualified to involve in the second round
voting. For each sensor i, denote N trusti (t) ⊆ Ni as the set of its all trustworthy neighbors.
The second round voting identifies one of the following three conditions of reading ri(t) of each
sensor in G:
• GOOD, if the majority of i’s neighbors are trustworthy (|N trusti (t)|/|Ni| ≥ 50%), and the
majority of its consistent neighbors are trustworthy (|N consi (t) ∩N trusti (t)|/|N trusti (t)| ≥
50%).
• ABNORMAL, if the majority of i’s neighbors are trustworthy, and the minority of its
consistent neighbors are trustworthy (|N consi (t) ∩N trusti (t)|/|N trusti (t)| < 50%).
• UNKNOWN, if the minority of i’s neighbors are trustworthy (|N trusti (t)|/|Ni| < 50%).
In this case, anomaly condition of reading ri(t) cannot be determined, due to the lack of
trustworthy references.
7.2.3 Novel Event and Anomaly Classification
In this stage, GAD aims to distinguish novelties from anomalies. Unlike anomalies that are
faults or errors, novelties are the emerging patterns in the physical process that were previously
unobserved. Novelties represent the real dynamics of physical phenomena, which may be critical
for industrial CPS applications. For example, the occurrence of sudden heightened temperature
(e.g. a fire) is a novelty to temperature monitoring systems rather than an anomaly.
In a correlated group G, the probability that the measurements of all sensors are unreliable
simultaneously is close to zero. Therefore, we assume that the novelty can be identified when
the majority of spatial correlations between sensor measurements changes, i.e. the readings of
7.3. FGAD Algorithm 101
more than 50% sensors in a correlation group are declared UNKNOWN. This assumption is
reasonable, because the fact that spatial varying physical phenomena should influence nearby
sensor readings at the same time. Therefore, when genuine environmental changes occur, the
correlation mappings between each pair of sensors in a correlation group should begin to vary.
7.3 FGAD Algorithm
As we discussed in the beginning of this Chapter, our GAD algorithm is designed to iden-
tify rapid pattern changes in sensor measurements and tag each sensor measurement with its
anomaly condition. However, according GAD cannot capture gradual pattern deviations (which
are typical in malicious attacks to avoid being detected) since these deviations are usually re-
garded as random noise and the pairwise models of norms in GAD will gradually adapt to these
deviations over time. To overcome this problem, in this section, we extend GAD and propose
a feature-based general anomaly detection (FGAD) algorithm base on MFDR and MFDR-N
proposed in Chapter 5. Unlike GAD, this algorithm computes the pairwise correlation models
from our MFDR or MFDR-N features which summarise the measurements within piecewise
time windows. Consequently FGAD is able to capture these long-term pattern deviations.
Figure 7.4: A high-level illustration of applying GAD and FGAD.
FGAD exploits the same framework of GAD to assess the pairwise correlation consistencies.
Fig. 7.4 illustrates the diﬀerences when GAD and FGAD operate. As can be seen, GAD uses the
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model of norms learnt from the measurements in the sampling window [t−△t, t− 1] to classify
pairwise correlation consistency between current measurements. On the other hand, FGAD
uses the model of norms learnt from previous M MFDR representations, which summarise
the measurements of each length △t window, to assess the pairwise correlation consistencies
between current MFDR representations.
With the above settings, in the phase of correlation-consistency assessment, the two axes in Fig.
7.3 (a) are replaced with the similarity measures between MFDR and MFDR-N features. This
allows us to utilise the same GAD framework to assess the model consistency of each MFDR
feature (i.e. local trend, seasonal component and noise). Also, to ensure the spatiotemporal
correlation needed by FGAD, in DMGA, we use Euclidean distance to describes the correlation
strengths between MFDR (or MFDR-N) features among sensors. The other operations of
FGAD (i.e. the trust-based voting and event/anomaly classification) are identical to those
we proposed in Chapter 7.2. To avoid duplication, we do not repeat these operations in this
section.
7.3.1 FGAD with MFDR
With MFDR technique proposed in Chapter 5, given sensor i and a time interval △t, its
normalised measurements ri(t) = {r¯i(t−△t) + 1, r¯i(t−△t+2), · · · , r¯i(t)} can be summarised
with a MFDR representation MFDR(ri(t), NTR, NSE), which consists of local trends riTR(t) and
seasonal components riSE(t), as illustrated in Fig. 7.5.
Consider each pair of sensors i and j in a correlation group G, the similarities of their trends and
periodically fluctuated seasonal components between time t −△t + 1 and t can be illustrated
with Dist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t)) and Dist(r
i
SE(t), r
j
SE(t)), respectively. As we discussed in Chapter 2.2,
these similarities should be temporally correlated to their previous representation similarities
before t − △t + 1. Therefore, the estimated consistency region of Dist(riTR(t), rjTR(t)) and
Dist(riSE(t), r
j
SE(t)), F˜i,j(t), can be computed, based on the similarities of their previous M
MFDR representations before time t −△t + 1. Here, F˜i,j(t) represents the set of all possible
values of Dist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t)) and Dist(r
i
SE(t), r
j
SE(t)).
7.3. FGAD Algorithm 103
Local Trend Seasonal Component Noise
Original Sensor Measurements MFDR
MFDR
MFDR-N
Figure 7.5: Illustration of correlation consistency assessment in FGAD.
Fig. 7.6 (a) illustrates this correlation consistency assessment in FGAD. If current similarities
pair (Dist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t)), Dist(r
i
SE(t), r
j
SE(t))) ∈ F˜i,j(t), we say this the measurements of sensor
i and j between time t − △t and t are consistent; otherwise, inconsistent. Let Ci,j(t) denote
this correlation consistency,
Ci,j(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1, if (Dist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t)), Dist(r
i
SE(t), r
j
SE(t))) ∈ F˜i,j(t)
0, otherwise
(7.5)
Similar to the way we compute R˜i,j(t) in GAD, here we propose a function, PCRFGADi,j (t,M,ϕ),
whereM denotes the number of piecewise windows, to compute the piecewise correlation region
F˜i,j(t) between sensor i and j at time t. Geometrically, F˜i,j(t) is a rotated ellipse area on the
Cartesian coordinate formed with Dist(riTR, r
j
TR) and Dist(r
i
SE, r
j
SE), as shown in Fig. 7.6 (a).
Here, the estimated center of the ellipse is defined as:
(D˜ist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t)), D˜ist(r
i
SE(t), r
j
SE(t))) (7.6)
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Figure 7.6: Illustration of correlation consistency assessment in FGAD.
which is computed by using Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA):
D˜ist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t))
= 0.5Dist(riTR(t−△t), rjTR(t−△t)
+ 0.5D˜ist(riTR(t−△t), rjTR(t−△t) (7.7)
The major and minor radius of the ellipse F˜i,j(t) are computed with singular value decompo-
sition (SVD). Here, the Eigen decomposition performs on the covariance matrix illustrated in
below,
COVTR,SE =
⎡⎢⎣ covTR,TR(t) covTR,SE(t)
covSE,TR(t) covSE,SE(t)
⎤⎥⎦ (7.8)
In this covariance matrix, each entry covTR,SE(t) is defined as:
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covTR,SE
= EGOODt,M [(Dist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t))− EGOODt,M [Dist(riTR(t), rjTR(t))])
(Dist(riSE(t), r
j
SE(t))− EGOODt,M [Dist(riSE(t), rjSE(t))])] (7.9)
where the operator EGOODt,M [·] returns the arithmetic average of previous reliable similarity mea-
sures of previous N piecewise windows. By solving Eq. (7.4) with this covariance matrix
(illustrated in Eq. (7.8)), the consistency region ellipse F˜i,j(t) can be computed, as shown
in Fig. 7.6 (b), where σai,j(t) and σ
b
i,j(t) are standard deviations related to the two principle
components, and ϕ is a parameter that controls the probability margin of F˜i,j(t). Ultimately,
based on the assessment results obtained with the above algorithm, anomalies are identified
with the same trust-based voting and event/anomaly classification schemes in GAD.
7.3.2 FGAD with MFDR-N
The only diﬀerence between MFDR and MFDR-N is that MFDR-N further extracts the noise
component eNO from sensor measurements. Therefore, using MFDR-N as our feature ex-
traction scheme, the estimated consistency region of Dist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t)), Dist(r
i
SE(t), r
j
SE(t)),
and Dist(eiNO(t), e
j
NO(t)), F˜i,j(t) , can be illustrated with a rotated three-dimensional ellipsoid
formed with Dist(riTR, r
j
TR), Dist(r
i
SE, r
j
SE), and Dist(e
i
NO, e
j
NO). The estimated center of this
ellipsoid is defined as:
(D˜ist(riTR(t), r
j
TR(t)), D˜ist(r
i
SE(t), r
j
SE(t)), D˜ist(e
i
NO(t), e
j
NO(t))) (7.10)
which is also computed by using EWMA illustrated in Eq. (7.7). The lengths of three principal
axes of the ellipsoid F˜i,j(t) here are computed by using the singular value decomposition (SVD),
where the covariance matrix is defined below:
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COVTR,SE,NO =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
covTR,TR(t) covTR,SE(t) covTR,NO(t)
covSE,TR(t) covSE,SE(t) covSE,NO(t)
covNO,TR(t) covNO,SE(t) covNO,NO(t)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (7.11)
where each entry covTR,SE(t) is defined in Eq. (7.9) (which is the same as the FGAD with
MFDR). As can be seen, diﬀerent from the covariance matrix illustrated in Eq. (7.8), FGAD
with MFDR-N computes the three-dimensional consistency region from a 3 × 3 covariance
matrix, where the similarity measures of all three MFDR-N features are considered. The rest
operations of FGAD here are identical to those of with MFDR.
7.4 Performance Analysis
Theorem 7.1 and 7.2 below demonstrate the scalability of GAD and FGAD.
Theorem 7.1. The per sensor computational complexity of GAD and FGAD is O(1) with
respect to the NDSS size |S|.
Proof. It can be seen only the consistency assessment stage of GAD and FGAD require heavy
computations, i.e. Eigen decomposition requires O(|G|2) matrix-multiplication operations for
each correlation group G ∈ G, where G is the grouping solution computed by DMGA. Therefore
the per sensor computational complexity is O(
∑
G∈G |G|2)/|S|). Consider DMGA, we have
∑
G∈G
|G|2/|S| ≤ |S|
Nmin
(Nmin + 1)2
1
|S|
= (Nmin + 1)2/Nmin
which is independent of S.
Theorem 7.2. The per sensor storage complexity of GAD and FGAD is O(1) with respect to
the NDSS size |S|.
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Proof. It can be seen that the cluster head in each correlation group sensor i ∈ S require to
store at most △t|G| ≤ △t(Nmin + 1) and MN |G| ≤MN(Nmin + 1), respectively. Therefore, it
is obvious that the per sensor storage complexity is independent of |S| (as Nmin is independent
of |S|).
7.4.1 Implementing GAD and FGAD in Real-World Sensing Sys-
tems
Here we further discuss the feasibility of implementing GAD in real-world NDSSs.
Operation Overheads
• Storage. the cluster head which computes GAD is required to store the sensor measure-
ments from all sensors in the same correlation group G in the previous △t window. For
example, when |G| = 8, △t = 30, and the size of each sensor measurement is 2-bytes,
the cluster head is required to store at most 480 bytes of measurements in its memory to
perform GAD. The storage requirement for FGAD can be similar to GAD. The cluster
head only required to store 640 bytes when |G| = 8, M = 10, N = 4 (where N denotes
the number of coeﬃcient), and the size of each coeﬃcient is 2-bytes. Both of these stor-
age requirements can be easily fulfilled by current resource-constrained wireless sensors
platforms, such as TelosB (10kB memory), iMote2 (256kB memory), and even Arduino
Uno (2kB memory).
• Computation. In GAD and FGAD, the SVD operation is the most computational-
intense operation. This PCA operates on 2 × 2 covariance matrixes. For example, in
correlation group having 4 sensor nodes, the cluster head only has to compute 6 covariance
values, to form the covariance matrixes needed by GAD. This make GAD be suitable for
resource-restrained micro control units (MCUs), such as MSP430, to perform.
• Communication. No matter what topology the NDSS adopts, GAD and FGAD only
require each group member to send a one-hop packet containing its readings to the cluster
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head, which results in a extremely light communication overhead. For example, assume
the sensor sampling rate is 10 readings per second and data packet size is 20 bytes
including packet header and payload (i.e. sensor readings). In this case, each sensor
node only needs to transmit 200-byte data per second. Such low data transmission rate
requirement can be support by most communication standards such as IEEE 802.15.4
(256 kbps). This communication overhead can be further reduced if we only run FGAD
in the NDSS since dimensionality-reduced features can be first extracted from raw data
at each sensor before being sent to the cluster head.
7.5 Evaluation
In this section, we are going to evaluate the performances of GAD and FGAD, which were
implemented with our MFDR as we illustrated in Chapter . In Chapter 7.5.1, we evaluate the
anomaly detection accuracy of GAD with real-world trace files. In Chapter 7.5.2, we test the
event detection accuracy of GAD and FGAD with with data from our simulator. Ultimately,
we test GAD with a small-scale testbed in Chapter 7.5.3.
7.5.1 Detecting Anomalies in NDSSs
To begin our evaluation, we have strived to obtain real-world data which contains natural
anomalies. All data sets we have encountered are lack of the ground-truth information regarding
anomaly occurrences. Therefore, we evaluated GAD by manually inject anomalous measure-
ments into a real-world data set from V&Amuseum. Four simulation scenarios based on realistic
models of physical phenomena, including Non-Diﬀusive, Logarithmic, Rational Quadratic and
Power Exponential [VAA04, VA06]. The covariance functions of these phenomenon are given in
Table 7.1, where di,s denotes the distance between sensor i and physical phenomenon s; Ej(t)
denotes the value of phenomenon s at time t.
In this simulation, we exploits the successful detection rate (SDR) and false-positive detection
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Table 7.1: The covariance function of four types of physical phenomena
Non-Diﬀusive Logarithm Rational Quadratic Power Exponential
Correlation
function
c
∑
sEs(t) c
∑
sEs(t)log(di,s + e) c
∑
s
Es(t)
(di,s+1)2
c
∑
sEs(t)e
−di,s
rate (FPDR) defined in eq. (6.8) and (6.8), respectively, to evaluate the performance of GAD
with two other anomaly detection algorithms which exploit similar techniques of our GAD.
The first one is improved distributed fault detection (DFD) algorithm[Jia09]. This algorithm
utilises the similar voting scheme as the one in GAD but assumes physical phenomena are
Non-Diﬀusive. Another one is a fully distributed statistical approach, which makes similar
assumption as GAD, i.e. measurement errors were Gaussian distributed, without exploit spatial
correlation. The detection criteria of this statistical approach is illustrated below:
rci(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
normal, if rt(t)− r˜i(t) ≤ 3σi(t)
anomalous, otherwise
(7.12)
where rci(t) denotes the measurement anomaly condition of sensor i at time t; rt(t) denotes
the measurement of sensor i at time t; r˜t(t) denotes the EWMA estimation of i’s measurement
at time t; σi(t) denotes the standard deviation of i of previous measurements from time t−△t
to t− 1.
Parameter and Simulation Settings
In this simulation, to simulate changes noise, we added additional normal background noise ξ
with a Gaussian distributed random variable illustrated below:
ξ ∼ N (ri(t), ri(t)
60
)
This guarantees approximately 99.7% of noise has its value lower than 5% of measurement
values. Also, sensors were clustered into 4-sensor and 8-sensor groups with DMGA.
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Two sensor anomalous behaviours [UBH09, GZH09], including Deviations (which increase sen-
sor measurements by 20% from their original value) and Noisy Readings (which increase the
amplitude by 500% higher than the original added background noise), were chosen to simulate
anomalous measurements. All of these anomalous behaviours were randomly injected into sen-
sor readings at specific probabilities as shows in Fig. 7.7 and Fig. 7.8. Furthermore, to achieve
a fair comparison, we set threshold needed by DFD to the maximum of level of noise in our
simulation, i.e. 5% of the measurement values. Similarly, the statistical solution used the same
window size (i.e. 30 measurements) as GAD for its pattern recognition.
Simulation Results
Fig. 7.7 and Fig. 7.8 illustrate the detection accuracies of the two anomaly-detection mech-
anisms and GAD to Deviations and Noisy Readings, respectively. In the scenarios against
Deviations, GAD and can achieve more than 99% SDR in Non-Diﬀusive, Logarithm and Ratio-
nal Quadratic scenarios while remain 0.1% FPDR1. In contrast, the FPDR of DFD significantly
increases at high anomaly occurrence rates in Non-diﬀusive scenarios (Fig.7.7 (a)). This is due
to the fact that DFD used statistic thresholds, which is very hard to find tune, to distinguish
anomalies from the norms. Also, although the statistical approach seems to achieve comparable
performance as GAD in the first three scenarios (7.7 (a)-(c)), it has much higher FPDR (2.6%)
than GAD in the Power-Exponential scenario (Fig. 7.7 (d)).
In the scenarios against Noisy Readings, GAD can detect more than 98% SDR and around only
0.1% FPDR in all four scenarios. This is comparable to those of DFD in the Non-Diﬀusive
scenario (Fig. 7.8 (a)), and generally better than the statistical approaches (which almost fails
to detect anomaly in Logarithm scenarios in Fig. 7.8 (b)) in all four scenarios. In addition, we
have also observed that larger group size provides better detection accuracy to GAD and DFD
in general.
1It is worth noting that the V&A museum data exploited in this evaluation is not anomaly-free; therefore,
detecting those embedded deviations is regarded as false-positive detection.
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Figure 7.7: Detection accuracies to measurement-deviation anomalies.
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Figure 7.8: Detection accuracies to noisy-measurement anomalies.
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7.5.2 Detecting Environmental Events in NDSSs
In this subsection, we examine the event identification ability of GAD (in which △t = 240)
and FGAD (in which △t = 240 and M = 10). To acquire representative results, each statistic
result was calculated from a one-week simulation. In each simulation, 240 sensors (clustered
with DMGA) were randomly deployed in a 30m×100m square area, where 30 diﬀerent Rational
Quadratic physical phenomena were randomly located. To simulate environmental events, for
every 240 seconds, every physical phenomenon source had 0.1% to 5% possibility to move for 240
seconds. Every sensor reported one measurement per 8 seconds synchronously, i.e. totally 10800
measurements were reported by each sensor for a day. Also, to gain comparable results between
GAD and FGAD, GAD only announced an event occurrence when 30% of the measurements are
regarded as events in the past △t every 240 seconds. Once events are detected in a correlation
group, GAD and FGAD in this correlation group retrained their correlation consistency models
and restart their detection function after △t and M△t seconds, respectively.
Fig. 7.9 illustrates the simulation results. As can be seen, both GAD and FGAD have no
perspective false alarms. However, GAD can detect around 98% environmental events and is
almost invariant to event occurrence rates. In contrast, FGAD achieves higher SDR (i.e. more
than 99%) at lower event occurrence rates; however, the SDR of FGAD significantly dropped to
around 94% when the event occurrence rate is at 5%. According to our analysis, GAD cannot
identify all the environmental events since there exist some slow-moving events, which only
results in gradual correlation changes, and therefore, cannot be identified by GAD. In contrast,
FGAD can detect those slow-moving events; however, once FGAD detects events, it requires
longer time (i.e. 10 time more than GAD) to re-establish its consistency models, in which
no events can be detected. Therefore, FGAD starts failing to detect environmental events at
higher event occurrence rates.
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Figure 7.9: The environmental detection accuracy of GAD and FGAD.
7.5.3 Small Scale Testbed Experiment
Unlike the previous two experiments, in this experiment anomalies were generated by creating
genuine environmental events such as moving sensor locations or controlling the value of physical
phenomena (i.e. turning on/oﬀ the lights). Also, to test whether GAD can be performed on
resource-limited sensor nodes, we implemented GAD with TinyOS 2.1.2 on a Crossbow MicaZ
motes, which have very limited computational power and memory. Note that due to the
limitation of our testing environment, we could not create gradual changes in the environment;
therefore FGAD was not tested.
Figure 7.10: The floor plan and sensor deployment in LAB.
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In this experiment, we deployed 8 MicaZ motes with light sensors in our lab as shown in Fig.
7.10. Among these sensors, sensor 3 and sensor 4 were located next to windows, where sunlight
would be more influential to their measurements; sensor 6 was located under the table, where
its measurements could be lower than others as it was partially covered by the shadow of the
table. Sensor measurements were collected every 5 seconds and were sent to sensor 1 for GAD
anomaly identification.
To create anomalies, we first generated five events by randomly turning on/oﬀ multiple lights in
the lab around every 180 seconds to 210 seconds. After those events, we generates anomalous
measurements by covering sensors with boxes which obstruct the environmental light. The
sensor measurements and anomaly detection results are shown in Fig. 7.11 and Fig. 7.12,
respectively. According to our analysis, GAD successfully ran on the resource-limited MicaZ
motes and identified 5 events and 62 anomalous measurements, identical to what we had gen-
erated.
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Figure 7.11: The light measurements of the 8 sensors in the testbed experiment.
Event@205s; 355s; 545s; 700s; 880s
Abnormality@Node1:1070s-1105s; Node2:1110s-1145s;
Node3:1150s-1180s; Node4:1195s-1230s; Node5:1250s-1285s;
Node6:1295s-1330s; Node7:1345s-1375s; Node8:1385s-1420s;
Figure 7.12: The snapshot of GAD detection result.
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7.6 Case Study : FDI Attack Detection in Smart Grids
In this section, we are going to use a real-world example, smart girds to demonstrate how our
GAD and FGAD can improve the overall system performance against false-data injection (FDI)
attacks. Smart grids systems use information and communication technology (ICT) to provide
reliable and eﬃcient electricity transmission and distribution of power grids[Far10, GLH10].
Here, sensors such as smart meters are connected via both power lines and ICT infrastructures.
However, the heterogeneity, diversity, and complexity of the smart grid components pose critical
challenge in ensuring overall cyber security [MKB+12]. This is because in smart grids, grid-
status inference and decision making may be performed on local smart devices rather than in
well-protected control centers. Therefore, unlike traditional power grids where the majority of
attacks and failures come from physical accesses to critical facilities [CBK09], the ubiquity of
smart-grid components further invite these abnormalities from cyber-infrastructures.
Among various emerging security issues, false data injection (FDI) attacks (i.e. maliciously
modify sensor readings) have a substantial cost in terms of the energy distribution process
[LNR11]. One example was the Northeast blackout of 2003 in the USA caused by a lack of accu-
rate real-time condition information (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast blackout of 2003).
7.6.1 Potential FDI Attacks in Smart Grids
The four most critical state estimations and the potential FDI attack targets related to these
are listed as follows.
• Energy Demand: The untruthful values of this state estimation are critical as they can
dramatically increase financial costs to both the energy users and providers due to the
extra cost of power transmission and the waste of energy that can occur. Moreover, they
can result in an even more devastating crisis, i.e. a power outage, where energy requests
to the smart grid are less than the energy demand that nodes truly require. Since these
nodes consist of energy consumers, such as personal users or companies, the adversary
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may launch such attacks either through infected personal devices such as laptops, or
through poorly configured firewalls [MKB+12].
• Energy Supply: The value of this state estimation is mainly provided by energy-supply
nodes. FDIs can falsely decrease the advertised quantity of their supplied energy, which
typically results in the starvation of energy-demand nodes who are not receiving what they
request. Reversely, a falsely advertised increase in energy supply can incur an increase
of wasted energy. These attacks can be achieved using malware to infect the servers of
power suppliers, falsifying the quantity of energy it can truly provide.
• Grid-Network States: The grid-network states are the configurations and conditions
of the power grids, such as grid topologies and power line capacities. For instance, adver-
saries can isolate nodes from the power grid by invalidating their power-line connection.
Maliciously forging the network states can seriously mislead the energy distribution, again
resulting in devastating power shortages or extra energy transmission costs.
• Electricity Pricing: Dynamic electricity pricing can greatly reduce the electricity bill of
consumers, such as energy-utility companies and houses, as well as help balance the power
loads between peak and oﬀ-peak periods. Therefore, fake electricity pricing would incur
significant damage to both the financial and physical subsystems that make up a smart
grid, negating their advantages of optimum supply eﬃciencies. For instance, adversaries
can falsely reduce prices during peak hours, which will ultimately result in grid system
overload. Also, illegal users may use malware to modify their energy bills, leading to a
loss of utility company revenue.
7.6.2 Detect FDIs in Smart Grids
To demonstrate how GAD can minimize the impacts of FDI attacks, simulations based on
a simplified version of the US smart grid (as illustrated in Fig. 7.13 [USS]) was conducted
in this subsection. In this set of simulations, each state contained 10 energy suppliers and
10 energy consumers to simulate local energy generations and consumptions within the state.
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Each of these suppliers/consumers generated 365 daily energy generation/consumption profiles
to simulate the annual behaviour of the smart-grid system. All these profiles used in this
simulation were based on 2009 US Energy Information Administration State Electricity Profiles
(available at http://www.eia.gov/).
Detect Naive FDIs in Smart Grids with GAD
In the frist part of our experiment, we focus on the naive FDIs which cause sudden pattern
changes in smart-grid components. Two diﬀerent types FDI attacks were considered in this
set of simulations: The first one aims to increase the metric Costtotal defined in [LNR11] (i.e.
the total energy transmission cost over all power lines in the smart grid system), by falsely
increasing the energy supply-demand value by 15% and 30% in our simulations. The second
one aim to incur significant power-supply outage rate (i.e. the percentage of outage states over
all energy demanding states). The demands of the energy consumers were maliciously increased
by 100% and 200% while the supplies of the energy suppliers were falsely decreases by 10% and
20%.
Fig. 7.14 shows the simulation results when applying GAD and the state-of-the-art distanced-
based (DB) solution [YL13, SPP+06] proposed in 2013. Both approaches referenced the past 30
days data (i.e. △t = 30) during evaluation. Also, the user-defined parameters of DB solution
were set as r=0.5 and D=0.5 [YL13]. As shown in Fig. 7.14 (a) and (c), GAD can significantly
reduce the adverse impact caused by FDI attacks with nearly zero false-positive detections.
The total energy transmission cost reduces from 6.35 to 5.21 million US dollars when FDI-
attack probability is 1%. In contrast, although the DB-detection scheme achieves comparable
cost reduction, it suﬀers from extremely high false-positive detection rate. For instance, when
the FDI-attack probability is equal to 1%, the DB-detection scheme treats about 40% correct
advertised energy supplying and demanding as FDI attacks. Such false-positive detections
would result in significant confusion in decision making and would incur additional costs, such
as extra human eﬀorts to understand the problem where the integrity of the information is
required to be checked manually.
7.6. Case Study : FDI Attack Detection in Smart Grids 119
Power Line
Figure 7.13: US smart grid topology [USS].
Fig. 7.14 (b) and (c) show similar results to our observation in the aforementioned simulation.
GAD manages to reduce the user outage rate from 40.5% to 18% with almost no false-positive
detections, while the distance-based solution suﬀered from false alarms, especially when the
attack probability is 1%. Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 7.14(d), GAD only introduces about
15% additional computational overhead to the system, while the DB-approach leads to more
than 4000% additional computational complexity, which demonstrate the high eﬃciency of
GAD.
Detect Sophisticated FDIs in Smart Grids with GAD and FGAD
In second part of experiment, we focus on more sophisticated FDIs, which cause measurements
gradually deviate from their norms. This prevents falsified measurements and smart-grid com-
ponents being detected by most recently proposed anomaly detection mechanisms including
our original GAD. In order to have enough data resolution that can reveal gradual deviations,
each energy supplier and consumer generates 7 measurements per day. With this setting, GAD
used 7 measurements (i.e. △t = 7) to establish its estimation models, FGAD used MFDR to
summarise these daily measurements (i.e. △t = 7) and 7 MFDR representations (i.e. N = 7)
to establish its estimation models.
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Figure 7.14: The performance of GAD in the smart grid FDI attack detection application.
Similar to the objectives in the previous simulation, two diﬀerent types FDI attacks were
considered in this set of simulations: The first one aimed to increase the metric Costtotal,
by falsely increasing the energy supply-demand value by 1% and 2% everyday until reaching
15% and 30% increases, respectively. The second one aimed to incur significant power-supply
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outage rate. The demands of the energy consumers were maliciously increased by 2.5% and 5%
until reaching 100% and 200% increases, while the supplies of the energy suppliers were falsely
decreased by 1% and 2% until reaching 10% and 20% decreases.
The results are as expected. While FGAD successful detected the above FDIs, GAD failed
to identify most of them. Fig. 7.15 illustrates the simulation results. As can be seen in
Fig. 7.15 (a), GAD only reduce 0%-30% of extra energy cost caused by FDIs, whereas FGAD
can achieve 78%-98% extra-cost reduction. Similar results shown in Fig. 7.15 (b). FGAD
successfully reduces user outage rate for 63%-81% while GAD only reduce 0%-18%. Note that
both GAD and FGAD have very low FPDR, which is negligible; therefore we do not plot the
FPDR results.
(a) energy transmission cost
(b) user outage rate
Figure 7.15: The performance of GAD and FGAD against sophisticated FDIs.
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7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we propose two novel anomaly classifier, GAD and FGAD. GAD is a dis-
tributed real-time approach that is able to identify rapid pattern changes in measurements and
tag each sensor measurement with its anomaly condition. Unlike current anomaly-detection
approaches that make stringent assumptions about physical phenomenon being sensed and
anomaly models, GAD assumes that spatiotemporal correlations exist in the physical system
and that measurement errors follow Gaussian distributions. In contrast, FGAD is a feature-
based approach that is designed to identify gradual pattern changes in measurements and tag
each piecewise data (i.e. measurement within a time interval) with its anomaly condition. It
assume the time series features (including trends, seasonal components and noise) extracted by
our MFDR and MFDR-N should be spatiotemporal correlated to those in the same correlation
group. Both GAD and FGAD only make well-accepted assumptions which normally hold true
in practice. The performances of GAD and FGAD are evaluated using real data from two
NDSSs: building structural monitoring and smart grids. Simulation results demonstrate that
GAD and FGAD can cope with diﬀerent type of anomalies in various NDSS scenarios while
remaining eﬀective and eﬃcient. In addition, a small-scale experiment also shows that our
approaches can be easily deployed on resource-limited NDSS platforms.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Summary of Thesis Achievements
Networked distributed sensing systems (NDSSs) have been providing promising opportunities in
many real-world cyber-physical system (CPSs) and Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. They are
capable of providing real-time and insightful information, allowing us to better understand and
solve problems in large-scale systems such as national-wide smart grids. However, in practice,
sensor readings may be abnormal or faulty due to various unpredictable causes such as harsh
environments, inherently fault-prone sensors, or malicious attacks. These anomalies could lead
to significant system performance degradation or even catastrophic failure. Therefore, detecting
such anomalies has become an significant aspect in related research.
Anomalies detection is essentially a classification task where data and sensors are classified
into normal or anomalous. This classification procedure typically consists of two diﬀerent
phases: feature extraction and anomaly classification. In the feature extraction phase, raw
sensor measurements are pre-processed to extract meaningful features. With these features,
classification schemes can then be applied to distinguish anomalous features from the norms.
In Chapter 3, we summarised the taxonomy of recently proposed anomaly-detection approaches
for NDSSs as per feature-extraction and anomaly classification technique. However, according
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to our study, most of these approaches are either limited to their rigid assumptions or neglect
the deployment limitations and challenges of NDSSs discussed in Chapter 2.1.1. Therefore, we
proposed a series of approaches that implement the anomaly detection framework discussed in
Chapter 3; including two novel multi-feature dimensionality-reduction representations MFDR
and MFDR-N (proposed in Chapter 5), and two general anomaly classifiers GAD and FGAD
(proposed in Chapter 7). In addition, to improve the eﬀectiveness and scalability of our ap-
proach, we further proposed a distributed matching-based sensor grouping algorithm DMGA
in Chapter 6. The contribution of each of our proposed solution is summarised below.
MFDR and MFDR-N
In Chapter 5, we proposed two novel feature-extraction techniques, MFDR and MFDR-N. As
discussed in Chapter 2, sensor measurements from a sensor in NDSSs are basically time series
data which consists of three time-series components, including local trends, seasonal components
and noise. MFDR extracts two time series components (i.e. local trends and seasonal compo-
nents) from sensor measurements and provides dimensionality reduced (DR) representations to
summarise these components. In comparison to other polynomial-based (e.g. Piecewise Linear
Approximation (PLA)) and spectral-transformation (i.e. Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT))
DR techniques, it guarantees the smallest representation errors between DR representations and
original time series. With this advantage, MFDR can provide results with enhanced accuracy
when computing the similarities between two time series data, while retaining the same order
in magnitude of computational overhead. Based on MFDR, MFDR-N further captures an-
other time series component, noise, by exploiting the characteristic of such component. With a
properly assigned noise threshold (which is 1 standard deviation according to our experiment),
MFDR-N preserves one additional feature in its representations, and therefore allows better
precision in approximating noisy time series.
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DMGA
In Chapter 6, we proposed a novel grouping algorithm, DMGA, to group sensor nodes into
several correlation groups, where strong spatiotemporal correlations exist among all sensors.
Besides decomposing the anomaly detection problem into sub-problems that can be solved
in each correlation group, this grouping algorithm can further provide correlation guarantees
required by our anomaly classification schemes. Therefore, with DMGA, our anomaly detection
solution can remain scalable and eﬀective in diﬀerent scenarios. To the best of our knowledge,
DMGA is the first correlation-aware grouping algorithm for NDSSs. It is more advanced as
it can be performed in a fully distributed manner (i.e. the computation and communication
complexity of DMGA is O(1) with respect to the size of NDSS) while providing theory guarantee
that the correlation strength among all sensors in each group is sub-optimal.
GAD and FGAD
In Chapter 7, we introduced two novel anomaly classifier, GAD and FGAD. Both GAD and
FGAD consist of three diﬀerent phases: pairwise-correlation modelling, trust-based voting, and
event/anomaly classification. In the first phase, the pairwise spatial correlation between each
pair of sensors in the same correlation group is modeled from historical measurements. If the
current pairwise spatial correlation computed from newly arrived measurements is not consis-
tent to this model, these two sensors regard each other untrustworthy, otherwise trustworthy.
Base on the information of trustworthiness, a two-round voting is performed to identify anoma-
lous measurements in the trust-based voting phase. If a sensor is regarded untrustworthy by
the majority of its neighbour in the same correlation group, this sensor or its measurements are
regarded anomalous. Ultimately, anomalies are classified into environmental events and sensor
failures with a preliminary diagnosis scheme.
To identify most of the anomalies in NDSSs, GAD and FGAD are designed to cope diﬀerent
types of anomalies in NDSSs. GAD is a distributed real-time approach that is able to identify
rapid pattern changes in measurements and tag each sensor measurement with its anomaly
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condition. Unlike many recent anomaly-detection approaches that make stringent assumptions
about physical phenomenon being sensed or anomaly models, GAD assumes that spatiotempo-
ral correlations exist in the physical environments where noise follow Gaussian distribution. On
the other hand, FGAD is a feature-based approach that is designed to identify gradual pattern
changes in measurements and tag each piecewise data (i.e. measurement within a time interval)
with its anomaly condition. It assumes the MFDR and MFDR-N features (including trends,
seasonal components and noise) extracted from a sensor should be spatiotemporal correlated
to its neighbouring sensors in the same correlation group.
When comparing with other state-of-the-art approaches, GAD and FGAD are simpler but
eﬀective against most of general anomalies in NDSSs. Both GAD and FGAD only make well-
accepted assumptions which normally hold true in practice. Therefore, it is not diﬃcult to
assign eﬀective parameters to GAD and FGAD. Our experiment results also supported this
argument.
8.2 Future Work
In this thesis, we have successfully implemented a series of our proposed approaches that oﬀers
detection of anomalies in networked distributed sensing systems. However, we believe there
are further potential to our study. Here we summarise the perspective extensions of our work
which could oﬀer insights to future research.
Indexable MFDR and MFDR-N
As we have presented in Chapter 5, MFDR and MFDR-N provides improved approximations
to original time series compared to other state-of-the-art approaches. Nevertheless, it is worth-
while noting that our current solution has limitation in providing lower-bound guarantee. The
distance between MFDR (and MFDR-N) representations in two given time series cannot guar-
antee lower bounding the distance between them (i.e. the original time series). This guarantee
is a desirable property for a DR representation as it allows DR representations to be directly
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exploited by classic indexing schemes such as R-tree [Gut84] without giving false negative re-
sults. Therefore, we aim to provide MFDR and MFDR-N with this guarantee while remain
their small representation error. There are three directions to achieve this:
1. Establish a new scheme to compute the distance between MFDR (and MFDR-N) repre-
sentations with lower-bound guarantee.
2. Provide elastic distance (a range of distance) measures between MFDR (and MFDR-N)
representations. With elastic distance, lower bound distances can be provided during
indexing and search to prevent false negative outcomes, whereas smallest-error distances
can be used in the post-data analytics to minimise error.
3. Analyse the property of MFDR and MFDR-N and establish models to describe the lower-
bound probability.
Algorithm Improvement in MFDR and MFDR-N
Although MFDR and MFDR-N are lightweight to compute, there are still further possibilities
in reducing their computational complexity. Firstly, MFDR and MFDR-N need to compute
the optimal combination of number of coeﬃcients for the two components. Currently, this
optimisation problem is resolved with a brute-force approach, which may be further reduced
with smarter algorithms. Secondly, MFDR-N has to be better enhanced with more accurate
de-noise algorithm. Our current approach is dependent on Gaussian approximated statistic
test despite the fact that the energy density of white noise is actually Chi-square distributed.
We would thereby like to replace our current approach with Chi-square-based test to provide
more accurate results.
Improving FGAD
Current version of FGAD is eﬀective against general anomalies; however, we have also noticed
that some malicious attacks can avoid being detected by further retarding the amount of false
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deviations. Since the size of pairwise window (where sensor measurements are summarised with
MFDR or MFDR-N) is static in FGAD, it may be too small to reveal such slow deviations. A
possible solution to this is to exploit a hierarchical design where FGAD are applied at multiple
time scales. Another limitation of FGAD is that it does not detect seasonal pattern changes. To
overcome this limitation, we would like to exploit the seasonal-similarity discussed in Chapter
2.2.2 and integrate the motifs techniques [KLF05, BK14] into our current framework.
Applying Our Approaches on Real-World Applications
Last but not least, we would like to see how our anomaly-detection approaches can collaborate
with other research in real-world applications, such as leakage detection in underground water
systems [KYM14], viral surveillance and disease tracking [SKS12, MWCH14, CM09], and IoT
security[XWP14]. We are also keen to see more applications of MFDR and MFDR-N since
they can be exploited in many other data processing and mining procedures such as our current
research on energy-aware in-network processing mentioned in Chapter 1.5, and other graph-
based similarity search techniques [YM15].
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorems in Chapter 5
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
According to Euler’s formula,
∑n
x=1 x cos(gx+ k) can be translated into the real part of a
complex exponential function as listed below:
n∑
x=1
x cos(gx+ k)
= Re
(
n∑
x=1
kei(gx+k)) = Re(
n∑
x=1
kei(gx+k)
)
= Re
(
ei(g+k)(
n∑
x=1
yg)′|y=eig
)
= Re
(
ei(g+k)(y
1− yn
1− y )
′|y=eig
)
The derivative term can than be expanded as the following equation, where we omit the Re
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notation for simplicity.
ei(g+k)
[
yn − 1
y − 1 −
y(yn − 1)
(y − 1)2 +
nyn
y − 1
]
y=eig
= ei(g+k)
[
(n+ 1)yn
y − 1 −
y(yn − 1)
(y − 1)2 −
1
y − 1
]
y=eig
= ei(g+k)
[
(n+ 1)eign
eig − 1 −
eig(eign − 1)
(eig − 1)2 −
1
eig − 1
]
= ei(g+k)
[
(n+ 1)eig(n−
1
2 )
2i sin g2
+
2ie
ing
2 sin ng2
4 sin2 g2
− 1
2i sin g2e
ig
2
]
= −(n+ 1)e
ig(n+ 12+
k
g )
2 sin g2
i+
eig(
n
2+1+
k
g ) sin ng2
2 sin2 g2
i+
ei(
g
2+k)
2i sin g2
Now we extract the real part from this complex equation, and can finally get:
(n+ 1) sin g(n+ 12 +
k
g )
2 sin g2
− sin g(
n
2 + 1 +
k
g ) sin
ng
2
2 sin2 g2
− sin(
g
2 + k)
2 sin g2
(A.1)
✷
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.7
For a normalised normalised white-noise series, we can find a relationship between the expected
energy density E¯k and the mean period T¯k of each of its IMF components as:
ln E¯k = − ln T¯k (A.2)
For a white noise series s = s1, s2, · · · , sm, the probability density function (PDF) of each its
IMF is approximately normally distributed. Therefore, the energy of such series should have a
χ2 distribution with m 1 degrees of freedoms as illustrated in Eq. (A.3).
1Although the actual degree of freedoms should be m− 1, since m≫ 1, for simplicity, we use m instead of
m− 1.
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ρ(mE(s)) = ρ0(mE(s))
m/2−1e−m/2 (A.3)
ρ0 = 1/2
mE¯/2Γ(
mE¯
2
)
For each IMF of s, the degree of freedoms is essentially the sum of the Fourier components the
IMF contains, which equals to the fraction of the energy contained in that IMF [] . Therefore,
the degrees of freedoms of IMFk is essentially mE¯k. With this observation, we derive the energy
density distribution of each IMF with Eq. (A.4)
ρ(mEk) = ρ0m(mEk)
mE¯k/2−1e−mE¯k/2 (A.4)
By substitute lnEk with yk, we can rewrite Eq. (A.4) as
ρ(yk) = ρ0m(me
yk)mE¯k/2−1e−mEk/2eyk
= ρ0m
mE¯k/2exp[−mE¯k
2
(
E
E¯k
− yk)] (A.5)
Since E = ey has very high dimensionality, we approximate E
E¯
with Taylor’s series at a zero
point:
E
E¯
= ey−y¯ = 1 + y − y¯ + (y − y¯)
2
2!
+
(y − y¯)2
3!
+ · · · (A.6)
When |y − y¯|≪ 1 , Eq. (A.5) can be approximated as
ρ(y) = ρ0m
mE¯/2exp{−mE¯
2
[1− y¯ + (y − y¯)
2
2
]}
= Cexp[
−mE¯(y − y¯)2
4
] (A.7)
where C = ρ0mmE¯/2exp[−12mE¯(1− y¯)].
Therefore, by comparing Eq. (A.7) with the Gaussian distribution illustrated below
A.2. Proof of Theorem 5.7 149
f(x) = a exp(−(x− x¯)
2
2σ2
)
where x¯ denotes the mean of x, and σ denotes its standard deviation. We can now calculate
the standard deviation σ from Eq. (A.7).
σ =
√
2
m
ex/2 (A.8)
By combining Eq. (A.8) with Eq. (A.2), we can derive two spread lines
y > −x± z
√
2
m
elnx/2
for the statistical significant test Eq. (5.17) depicts. ✷
